February 12, 1863, The Charleston Mercury
All information points to an early attack upon Charleston by the water approach and by land. There are grounds to expect a fleet of some eight or ten iron-clad gunboats to try the harbor, while a formidable force will march on us from some landing place to the southward or northward of the city. The signs of activity and preparation on our coast, and the appearance of the iron-plated steam batteries, mean work. We may rest assured that great efforts will be put forth for the reduction of this place.
Charleston is bitterly hated, because of her early prominence in secession, and because of the victory of Fort Sumter, when the stars and stripes were first lowered to the Confederate arms. Into this port have been imported nine-tenths of the arms and ordnance and munitions of war, clothing for the soldiers, and shoes and medicines which have been brought in for the Confederate armies. These reasons of moral and practical expediency for an effort to reduce the city, have received additional stimulus from the repeated and severe failures in their inland expeditions in Carolina, and from the disasters recently suffered in their naval arm. But stronger and more imperative than aught else is the threatened complication with neutral nations, through the recent rout and dispersion of the blockading fleet by the Palmetto State and Chicora.
The attack on Charleston, we are informed through Northern sources, has been determined on some time since. The last reason for making it, is peremptory, and forbids a much longer delay. If the blockade is raised at the port of Charleston for neutral vessels choosing to enter it, there is but one way for the United States to mend the matter – by taking Charleston. This is what they are now vigorously intent upon attempting. It is our business to see that the attempt shall fail, and to be fully ready to meet it. The fight in the harbor between our batteries and the iron- clad gunboats is going to be an experiment, concerning which we and the world have no experience from the past. Although very hopeful of the result, we should prepare to fight the city itself in defence. How are our commissary stores and army supplies? We have powerful works, able and devoted Generals and admirable soldiers. Have we enough? Let us dismiss as idle the notion that Charleston is not to be attacked, and at once address ourselves heartily and with energy to the task before us. Stern work is near and not remote. Let us put away self delusion and flattery, and take the common sense of strong probability doe our guide.