June 10, 1863, The New York Herald
Our Walnut Hills Correspondence.
HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTEENTH (McPHERSON’S)
ARMY CORPS, WALNUT HILLS,
REAR OF VICKSBURG, May 22, 1863.
For several days the disposition of the troops designed for the reduction of Vicksburg has been going on with unceasing energy. The peculiar formation of the country in this vicinity makes it a matter of no small importance to thoroughly comprehend the ground before using it for military ends, because there are some hostilities hereabouts which possess striking advantages over others, yet they do not appear upon first sight. Accordingly, the day after the arrival of the army here General Grant spent most of his time in riding over the ground and studying out the positions. This being finished, on the following day the troops were moved to the positions which they were to occupy and hold, in corps, taking positions, with the Fifteenth (General Sherman) on the right, the Seventeenth (General McPherson) in the centre, and the Thirteenth (General McClernand) on the left.
General Sherman the day before had detached part of his command, with orders to march against a strong position in the enemy’s possession at Chickasaw Bluffs. The movement was made, and resulted most eminently in our favor – that is, without the loss of a man. The enemy, hearing of the presence of our army in the rear of Vicksburg and its proximity to their own position, concluded that the better part of valor would be the evacuation of their works, which action was had immediately and without delay. The possession of this point is of great importance to this army in its present movements. It gives us a ready and short line of communication between our base of supplies at Young’s Point and the army in the field, the distance being but fifteen miles by water and ten by land, making twenty-five miles; and by this time the arrangements are so far matured that in a day from Young’s Point supplies of all sorts can reach the army.
Having every facility at his command, the troops in possession of every necessary to their comfort and efficiency, the men in the best of spirits after a victorious campaign from Grant Gulf to Big Black and the positions we now hold in the rear of Vicksburg, Gen. Grant planned the assault upon the enemy’s works which came off today. The arrangement was to make a simultaneous move on all points, basing success upon the consideration that the insufficient garrison of the place would not be able to contest equally our assault at all points, and, as a consequence, the weaker places could be taken while the stronger were making their defence. This conclusion was very natural, and there seemed hardly a doubt that at this moment our troops would be at least in possession of several of the enemy’s outer works, the occupation of which would insure as a decided advantage in position. But some of the commands were behind time, others but indifferently carried out the detail of the movement, and, as a consequence, lost all; and still others were not supported as they should have been, and to our melancholy experience. This evening we found our lines less advanced in some parts than they were this morning. However, due to the high state of discipline of the army, instead of being disheartened at our repulse and severe loss, the men are even more determined than they were at first; they think of nothing but the capture of Vicksburg – a fact, under such circumstances, surely to be realized.
General Grant’s order, issued last night, ordered that all the reserve troops should be formed in line at an early hour this morning, and that those commands selected for the storming of the fortifications should be drawn up in […..] by division,” so as to be ready to move at precisely ten o’clock this morning, which was the hour designated for the assault to commence. An hour earlier the artillery opened a vigorous fire, the supervision of which was under Lieutenant Colonel A. M. Powell, chief of artillery of this corps. The firing was excellent, almost every shot striking the crest of the parapet, and nearly all the shells exploding immediately over the inner side of the breastworks. Of course it is not possible to judge of the enemy’s loss, but he certainly must have suffered severely during our heavy fire. Two large explosions occurred within the works during the engagement, which were thought to be caissons. A large building was also destroyed by our shell.
At the given hour the troops of this corps were in motion moving along the ravines, in which to assume the required formation and make the attack. The commands set apart for this dangerous mission were the brigades of Stevenson, Ransom and Boomer, their assaults being directed upon different points of the central works. The charges here were most admirably executed. With perfect composure the men moved up the hill, though not under fire, yet under the influence of a dreadful anticipation of a deadly volley at close quarters. When within forty yards of the works of a sudden the parapet was alive with armed men, and in an instant more the flash of thousands of muskets hurled death and destruction most appalling into the ranks of our advancing columns. Stevenson’s brigade withered before the destroying agent. Five hundred men lay dead or bleeding on the field at the first fire. Bravely, against all odds, the command fought until its depleted ranks could no longer stand, when sullenly it withdrew under cover of a hill near by. More praise is due to the brigade of Ransom. In addition to the heavy musketry fire which repelled the assault of Stevenson, artillery played with dreadful havoc upon the fading ranks of Ransom, and, after every effort to win the goal, he, too, was obliged to give way, not to numbers, but impregnability of position. Nor was Colonel Boomer’s attempt more fortunate than either of the former, but it was more determined than the rest. Late in the afternoon he made one more effort to carry the position. He did not survive this last assault. At the head of his command he fell mortally wounded, and died a few moments after. Colonel Boomer as an officer was admired by all; as a leader he had no equal. Through the entire operations of this army he has taken part, and has always borne himself with dashing address. His loss is a sad one and almost irreparable.
The assaults on the parts of the other corps were not more fortunate than those of this. It has been reported that McClernand took two forts in the afternoon, but lost them for want of support. The same is reported of Gen. Sherman. Upon the whole, as regards the designs of our movement, we were frustrated, but nothing more. Our troops, with but few exceptions, hold their own. The loss of the day’s engagements has been exceedingly heavy according to first accounts, which are not the most reliable, and it is to be hoped the authenticated returns will greatly lessen the casualties. Our entire loss is estimated at one thousand killed and wounded, the heaviest loss being in the brigade of Stevenson. Among the killed are Col. Pollins, Eighty-first Illinois; Colonel Boomer, commanding Third brigade, Seventh division; Colonel Nevis, Eleventh Illinois, and Lieut. Colonel Graham, Ninth Iowa. Among the wounded are Col. Stone, Twenty-second Iowa; Colonel Humphrey, Ninety-fifth Illinois, and Colonel Staring, Seventy-second Illinois.
General A. L. Lee, commanding a brigade of Osterhaus’ division, was badly wounded in the face by a sharpshooter while leading his men through a ravine densely grown with cane. General Carr was reported mortally wounded, but this I learn later is a mistake. We lost in prisoners two companies of the Seventh Missouri and parts of two companies of the Ninth Iowa. The men of this regiment were taken within the enemy’s works, they having successfully scaled the ramparts, but could not hold their ground against the superiority of numbers brought against them.
At this hour, it being evening, the troops on McClernand right are still engaged, the enemy having advanced with a view to forcing his lines from their original positions. There is no probability, however, of the success of the enemy endeavor. The firing gradually grows more distant, which shows the advantage is on our side.
The failure of our endeavors to take the city by assault will be succeeded by an effort to reduce the place by means of the spade – to what purpose, whether to mine or approach by means of parallels, has not been determined. The argument in favor of this course is economy of life, for even a successful attack upon the city would be attended with an extravagant loss of men.
The strength of Vicksburg towards the land is equally as strong as on the river side. The country is broken to a degree affording excellent defensive positions, and as attacking party must necessarily be exposed to a fire which could not be withstood by any troops. In addition to this, the ravines intervening the ridges and knolls, which the enemy has fortified, are covered with a tangled growth of cane, wild grape, &c., making it impossible to move the troops in well dressed lines. The attempt of to-day has exhibited the impossibility of taking the city by storm; but a few weeks of the spade will show that Vicksburg can be taken. Let the people of the North feel assured of this.