July 2, 1863, The New York Herald
General Meade has commenced in Maryland and Pennsylvania, with the most promising results thus far, his active operations against the invading rebel army of General Lee. Our brief reports from the headquarters of the army of Tuesday’s brilliant operations by the Union cavalry, and the despatch announcing the occupation of York in force by the national troops, lead us to the conclusion that the lines of advance covered by the national army extend from York southwestwardly to some point near Frederick, in Maryland, thus covering on the south the entire flank of the rebel army, which appears to be rapidly retiring.
All these operations, however, were east of the Cumberland valley (the continuation in Pennsylvania of the Shenandoah valley), in which all the heavy columns of Lee are doubtless situated, between Carlisle and the Maryland border. Our forces will probably meet the enemy in strength in crossing over the dividing mountain into this valley, unless, as was reported some days ago, we are already on the west side of the mountains on the left, in which case Lee may be compelled to fall back over the Potomac river. We have no doubt that General Meade’s army heavily outnumbers that of the enemy, and that thus the strategy of concentration on the part of Lee against any point of the Union lines will not avail him. We guess that, while General Meade will bring all his forces into play, if necessary or expedient, he will take good care that no particular column is beyond the reach of heavy reinforcements. We are satisfied from Lee’s cautious movements that he does not desire a general engagement, except upon the most advantageous terms; and we do not believe that Meade is the man to allow the enemy to choose his own terms for either a defensive or offensive engagement.
It is a remarkable fact that on the very next day after the appointment of General Meade to the command of the Potomac Army we should begin to hear of the retreat of the enemy from the line of the Susquehanna. The inference naturally follows that Lee at once appreciated his danger with a bold and skilful opposing general to deal with, who retires at night clear headed, cool and collected, and who proceeds to business in the morning with the strictest regard to that all important military requisition of sobriety. In dealing with Meade it is not the question to Lee of “Philip drunk or Philip sober,” but the question of a trial of strength with a superior army, the leader of which is always wide awake and with his wits about him. Hence we incline to the opinion that the appointment of General Meade to the head of our army was accepted by General Lee as a warning to prepare for the contingency of a speedy return to the Shenandoah valley.
Our apprehensions as to the safety of Washington are gone. We are assured from headquarters that whole army is in splendid spirits, and that officers and soldiers have the fullest confidence in their new commander. The whole aspect of the campaign is changed from darkness to brightness, from apprehensions of serious disasters to anticipations of decisive victories. We now feel at liberty to turn from the question of the protection of Washington to the opportunity for the complete overthrow and dispersion of the rebel army. Had the administration promptly put into execution the laws of Congress and the ample powers therein granted for reinforcing our armies, we might have had this day an army at Washington of one hundred thousand men, in addition to all the forces now assembled there, and within a circuit of sixty miles from the capital. This new army, if now on hand, would be sufficient to secure the complete annihilation of the army of Lee and the death blow to the rebellion. But, under the mischievous counsels of such abolition professors of the art of war as the Wades, Chandlers and Wilsons, the administration for months was diverted from the movements of the rebels in Virginia to the stupid sayings and doings of peace orators and copperhead peace journals in the Northwest; while Gen. Hooker, instead of vigilantly watching the enemy in his front, was busy day and night in regulating or suppressing the circulation of newspapers and in a foolish campaign against the newsboys.
But, notwithstanding all this budget of blunders, we may congratulate the country that in the crisis of the public danger the proper steps have been adopted for the public safety. These steps, in the right direction, have been delayed to the eleventh hour; but we are sanguine that they will save the day. From the dispute between General Hooker and General Halleck in regard to the value of Harper’s Ferry resulting in Hooker’s removal, we think that the supreme importance of Harper’s Ferry has been fully established, whether the place may be abandoned or captured to-day or to-morrow, or held to the end of the war. In giving us at this important juncture a new commanding general who possesses the confidence of the army, and whose abilities for his position are already beginning to be illustrated in the field, Harper’s Ferry has resulted in securing us the most desirable of all things demanded by the exigencies of the day.
In view of the speedy expulsion of the rebel forces from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and in view of the necessity which will then compel General Lee to take the back track to Richmond, we should think that the wise heads of the War Office have had experience enough in our past campaigns in Virginia to know what to do. They know by this time all the highways and byways along which an army may get out of the Shenandoah valley into the country east of the Blue Ridge; and how an army, even after crossing the mountains, may be intercepted on the road to Richmond. First, however, let us await the issue of the movements of the opposing armies in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and then, with the expulsion of the enemy back into the Shenandoah valley, the failure of the War Office so to cooperate on the enemy’s flank with the movements of General Meade upon their rear will result in a public demand for a reconstruction at Washington which President Lincoln will be able no longer to resist. On the other hand, let the War Office seize the opportunity and secure the defeat and dispersion of the rebel army of Virginia, and all that past blunders and acts of negligence on the part of Messrs. Stanton and Halleck will be forgotten in the general exultations of a grateful people.
It is the army of Lee that is now in danger; and now that the government has the men — volunteers and militia — and the means at hand, for the overthrow and dispersion of his army — now is the time to bring them all into action.