April 3, 1863, The New York Herald
All the evidences that crowd upon us from all quarters clearly indicate that we are about to enter upon the most important stage of the struggle in which the energies and hopes of the nation are engaged. No one who has watched the preparations on the Union side can doubt that the effort that is to be made during the ensuing spring months is to be the final and crowning one, and that before midsummer the authority of the government ought to be restored over all the revolted States. The rebels, if not impressed with the same conviction, are nevertheless preparing for the campaign as if they were equally alive to its importance. They are concentrating their armies and strengthening themselves by every means that engineering skill can devise, at Fredericksburg, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, Port Hudson, Vicksburg, Tullahoma, Chattanooga and the Bayou Teche. These are the strong points of their lines of defence, and if they are taken they know that the rebellion will be practically at an end. All their best generals have accordingly been despatched to these points – Joe Johnston to the line of the Duck river; Kirby Smith to Bayou Teche; Beauregard to Charleston and Savannah; Buckner, with Buchanan as naval commander, to Mobile; Loring to the Tallahatchie; D. H. Hill to North Carolina; Price to Arkansas; Longstreet to East Tennessee, whilst Lee is retained in Virginia. Thus it will be seen that whatever of military talent and experience is possessed by the rebels is so distributed as to make the most effective resistance possible to the advance of the overwhelming force with which we are preparing to crush them. Whilst on the rebel side they are beginning to suffer from insufficient supplies of food and the impossibility of forcing fresh conscripts into the field to defend the numerous points threatened, the accounts of the commanding generals and of our correspondents go to show that our armies in Virginia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Kentucky and Tennessee are in splendid fighting condition, not only as regards physique, but morale, and that all that is now needed to insure the full success of the campaign is for our generals to be left to carry out the plans of operations that have been agreed upon without any further interference or dictation from inexperienced Secretaries or meddling politicians.
Impartial observers of the events of the present war would probably be more amazed at the controlling influences of politics upon the federal authorities directing its operations than with any other feature connected with it. Detachments from our main armies have been made, equivalent to what, previous to the war, would have been regarded as respectable armies in themselves, and for no other purpose but the acknowledged one of appeasing the vociferous clamor of certain powerful factionists. This political strategy, aside from its enormous expense, has divided the federal forces into numerous fragments, each acting separately, and in many instances according to the peculiar and conflicting notions of the different localities and feelings. This most disastrous policy on the part of the authorities has accomplished for the rebels precisely that which Napoleon always considered the first step towards victory – viz: the facility of piercing the enemy centre, and then throwing his entire army upon each wing and overpowering them in detail. This, connected with the fact that these same political factions have been constantly interfering with military operations in the field, and thereby frustrating or perverting the plans of commanders, has, without question, contributed more than anything else to give aid and comfort to the rebels and to prolong the war.
When General McClellan was assigned to the command of the troops for the defences of Washington, in July, 1861, directly after General McDowell had been forced by politicians to advance upon the enemy before his preparations were at all perfected, the people were so indignant at the course which had been pursued that it was believed the new commander would be permitted to manage his army without the assistance of the political generals in Congress. But before he was ready for an offensive movement the same men who had before goaded on McDowell renewed their efforts upon McClellan. But fortunately for the country he possessed the moral courage to resist their importunities, and continued to devote his whole energies to the equipment, discipline and efficiency of his army. For resisting the pressure exerted by them he incurred their bitterest animosity, and they heaped upon his head the most violent abuse. He was entirely too slow for these rapid strategists. His loyalty and ability were questioned, and, as strange as it may appear, although he has never by word or action attempted to refute any of their slanders, or paid the slightest heed to their assaults, yet they have never ceased their efforts for his destruction. They demanded that he should assault the strong works at Centreville and Yorktown, and because he would not yield to their clamors, and sacrifice the lives of thousands of his men to no purpose, they raised the cry of traitor against him. Through all this he preserved a commendable and dignified silence, which was properly appreciated by the people. His army was new, and did not acquire the necessary drill and equipment until it was too late in the autumn to make a forward movement, and he did not believe in the policy of risking the fate of the Union in attacking, until he was fully prepared, a position selected, studied and fortified by the enemy, and occupied by their best troops. His men had never been under fire, and he was perfectly aware that it required veteran soldiers to assault intrenchments such as those at Centreville. What more conclusive evidence of the correctness of his decision and of the culpable folly of his enemies could be adduced than the fact that a year after this, when the same army had become the veterans of more than a dozen different sanguinary battles, it was most signally repulsed in attempting to carry the intrenchments at Fredericksburg, which were not one-tenth part as formidable as those at Centreville and Yorktown? If ten thousand gallant men fell victims to the effort to storm those works, what result might have been expected from assaulting the fortifications at Yorktown, the Torres Vedras of this continent, without making regular approaches? Look at Vicksburg and Port Hudson.
Before the Army of the Potomac was in proper condition for an offensive campaign the roads became so bad that it was impossible to move artillery and supplies over them. Yet the political generals did not cease their attacks upon the commander for not advancing. The necessary and entire cessation of active military operations for over four months from the same cause, muddy roads, by the present Army of the Potomac, which has been amply supplied with everything necessary for a campaign, is a most scatling commentary upon the injustice of the partisan attacks upon General McClellan during the winter of 1861-2. Why do not these same men direct their venom upon the present commanders, who have been forced to pursue the same course that General McClellan did? Is it because they are the men of their own selection? Not content with having forced General McClellan out of his command, they are devoting their energies to his total overthrow and annihilation. They go back through his entire military career and search his record most assiduously, hoping to find something which they may use against him. A committee in Congress, composed of men well known to be his bitterest enemies, are charged with the task of taking evidence against him, and they are even authorized to prolong their session for thirty days after the adjournment of the body to which they belong; and, as has been stated, they are to publish at once that part of their investigation which in their opinions militate against General McClellan and his friends in the army, while the remainder of their report is to be filed away and not published. Gen. McClellan’s acts from the beginning of the war have been fully understood by the government, and it was in the power of the President at any moment to have ordered a court martial for his trial; but, instead of doing this, he, when the magnificent army under Pope had been badly defeated, and when the national capital was considered in imminent jeopardy, called upon this officer to come forward again and take the entire control of the routed troops and save the honor of the nation. He responded most cheerfully to this appeal, and the manner in which he executed this most important trust is well known to his countrymen.
We trust that the campaign on which our armies are now entering will not be marked by similar unfortunate influences. We have all the elements of success at our command, and nothing but the officious meddling of politicians or the personal piques and jealousies of Cabinet officers can prevent our crushing out the rebellion within the next three months. It is for the President to take care than they do not again frustrate the efforts which are costing us such heavy sacrifices. The country has vested him with fuller powers than were ever enjoyed by any of his predecessors, and if he fails in his duty it will hold him to a corresponding responsibility.