June 2, 1863, The New York Herald
The mysterious and threatening movements of the rebel army of Virginia have created the suspicion that it is the intention of General Lee to repeat immediately his aggressive campaign of last summer. Under this idea we are assured there is another great scare in Washington. According to our information the Cabinet are really apprehensive that, getting round or getting over the superior army of General Hooker, the terrible rebel General Lee may not only invade Maryland again, but that, more successful than he was the last time, he may possibly be able this time to get into Washington by way of Frederick city or Baltimore.
The deplorable failure of General Hooker at Chancellorsville, on his own chosen ground, against a rebel army not more than one-half his own in point of numbers, appears, from all that we can learn, to have completely demoralized the administration in regard to the further prosecution of the war in Virginia. In the first place, General Hooker’s rashness placed him in a position where the house in front of which he was standing was knocked to pieces by the enemy’s shells, and he was prostrated by one of the falling timbres, and lay for some time in a helpless and doubtful condition in the very crisis of the battle. Otherwise, perhaps, he might have seen his opportunity, and by sending up an unemployed army corps at hand to the support of General Sickles he might have cut the rebel army in twain and utterly routed it in that Saturday’s fight. In the next place, in recovering from his fall, it seems that General Hooker did not recover his balance of mind, but that from this unfortunate accident, and from the breaking of his lines by the enemy, he saw no safety except in a retreat, when by a general engagement at any time from Sunday morning to Monday evening he might have obtained a decisive victory.
Rash when he should have been prudent, and timid when he should have been bold, we can hardly wonder that General Hooker’s capabilities to resist an advance by General Lee are doubted by our supreme military authorities at Washington. They are afraid of him: but they are afraid to make a change, and they know not what to do. The reinstatement of McClellan would instantly scatter all doubts and misgivings to the winds, and put the Army of the Potomac again on the trail of the rebel army; but this sensible and patriotic proceeding would involve so much of wounded pride at Washington and partisan humiliation that it is not to be thought of. What, then, is to be done? We have no doubt that it is the intention of General Lee to resume offensive operations. Action with him has become a necessity. He cannot afford to await the convenience of our military authorities. He must do something in the way of a diversion to strengthen his confederates in the Southwest, where General Grant has driven them to the wall, even if nothing more can be done by the rebel army of Virginia in support of Vicksburg. But if Gen. Lee, by a flank movement towards Washington and Maryland, can so frighten our federal authorities as to induce a recall of the Army of the Potomac, and a general concentration around Washington and along the Maryland border of all our available force within a circuit of five or six hundred miles, while at the same time Jeff. Davis is sending off to the Southwest his reinforcements from Virginia to Joe Johnston by thousands, a great deal will be accomplished towards arresting our victorious progress in the West, as well as to strengthen the rebellion in the East.
Some designs of this sort are doubtless entertained by General Lee; and from the scare which is reported to exist at Washington we should conjecture that his whole army is close again upon the old battle field of Bull run. Meantime in the conscription law the administration has had the power so to strengthen our armies in every quarter as to render them absolutely irresistible, East and West. But the administration has hesitated, and still hesitates, to resort to the conscription in advance of some encouraging victory or another disastrous defeat; and so we presume that while the President and his Cabinet are waiting for the news of the capture of Vicksburg they have resolved to risk another grand rebel foraging foray into Maryland, rather than boldly and energetically exercise the power which congress has placed in their hands to sweep this rebellion from the field.
These are humiliating reflections; but we cannot avoid them. Where is the remedy against this shuffling, timid and temporizing policy of the government? We see no remedy except in a reconstruction of the Cabinet of strong, consistent and harmonious war men, excluding all pedling and tricky Presidential politicians, all miserable political cliques and all such Marplots in the conduct of the war as the Wades and Chandlers and their impertinent instructions. But let the President boldly meet the demands of the crisis in this way, and volunteers or conscripts, there will be no difficulty in reinforcing the army to the extent, if needed, of another million of men.