June 25, 1863, The New York Herald
The new campaign has now developed itself. It is a campaign of genuine invasion; but what is the prize? The theory that Lee, under cover of a pretended invasion, was sending away his army to Bragg, is exploded. Far more likely it is that Bragg has sent away his army to Lee. So, too, the idea of an invasion of Ohio by way of Western Virginia is dissipated into thin air. The other hypothesis, that Lee merely intended to spend the summer in the valley of the Shenandoah and the Upper Potomac, making raids upon Cumberland valley for subsistence and plunder, is also disposed of. It will be seen by a telegraphic despatch from Baltimore that the rebels had already crossed South Mountain, and are marching with infantry, cavalry and artillery upon Frederick, the capital of Maryland, out of which a small force sent in advance had previously been driven by some Union cavalry. Yesterday morning they were half way between Middletown and Boonsboro; so that by this time they are probably in possession of Frederick. What that means we shall presently see. In the same way the force that recently threatened Harrisburg retired; but now a larger force is advancing against it, and the Union troops are retreating before the invaders. There is no doubt that the rebels would be glad to get possession of Harrisburg; but they can hardly expect that at present. Their immediate object is to destroy the bridge there, or induce our troops to do it, and to destroy the other bridges on the Susquehanna.
Thus, by a bold and rapid movement of the rebel general, the theatre of war in Virginia has been transferred northeastward from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, and even to the Susquehanna. Lee has successfully achieved the most difficult and dangerous operation in war – a flank movement in presence of the enemy. Had Hooker been on the alert he could have inflicted upon him in his march irreparable damage, and driven him back in confusion. By moving on the chord of the arc, with his fine cavalry he might have seized the gaps in the Blue Ridge and assailed Lee’s flank, cutting his army in two, or he could have destroyed his trains and chopped up his rear. But Lee, without any considerable loss, has succeeded in making a circuit around the right flank of the Union army and getting in the rear of Washington, while Hooker, we believe, is still in the front of the federal capital. We were told that the cavalry battle at Brandy Station, near the Rappahannock, more than a fortnight ago, would defeat the purpose of Lee and prevent invasion. It has not done so. We have been assured that similar results would flow from the more recent cavalry fights at Aldie and its vicinity – that at least Lee was baffled in his purpose of descending upon the old battle field of Bull run, or upon Washington on its southern side, or upon Hooker’s army, stretched between; and that, in fact, the capital was now safe from attack in the front, which is certainly true, as Lee never contemplated assaulting its formidable fortifications on that side. It does not, however, follow that the city is equally safe from attack in the rear. It was stated yesterday by a correspondent of a city journal, who appears to possess the confidence of our commanding general, that the enemy would not dare to enter Maryland with so fleet an army as that of Hooker in his rear. But from a telegraphic despatch in the same journal it appeared that Lee had already not only dared to cross the Potomac, with at least the van of his army under Ewell, but that he occupied South Mountain and Boonsboro valley. A later despatch this morning shows that his advance had crossed the mountain and was moving on Frederick. How soon the main body may dare to follow remains to be seen. By recent accounts it had been massed in the valley of the Shenandoah, with its communications open on one side with Winchester and with Williamsport on the Upper Potomac, and on the southern side with Culpepper, Gordonsville and Richmond. From his present position he may follow on the track of Ewell, or by turning short to his right, over the mountains, he may cross the Potomac at Leesburg, or still lower down, at Coon’s Ford, which is just above the Great Falls, or about fifteen miles from Washington – an easy day’s march to the capital. It is calculated that the defences on the northern side can be easily carried by an attack by way of Bladensburg; and it is stated by our Baltimore correspondent that a co-operating corps of Lee, left behind at Fredericksburg, is to cross the Lower Potomac at Budd’s Ferry, some twenty-five miles below Washington, and that it has as a complete set of pontoons ready for the purpose.
But Lee is not likely to attack the city as long as Hooker’s army is intact and can man the fortifications. His object is by manoeuvres to draw Hooker sufficiently far away from Washington to enable the rebel army to reach it by forced marches and storm the works before Hooker can arrive for its relief; or to lure him into a battle at some point in Maryland or Pennsylvania, or in the valley of the Shenandoah, and, defeating him, cut off the remnant of his army from Washington, thus rendering the capital of the Union his easy prey.
All rebel movements towards Pittsburg, Harrisburg and Baltimore may be regarded as feints. No doubt if a detachment of four or five thousand men could by a coup destroy the government property at Pittsburg and retreat, it would be regarded as a very good enterprise; and Wheeling might also be visited at the same time. But that Lee intends to go there, or send any large number of his army, under present circumstances, is simply absurd. It serves Lee’s purpose to menace several cities together. The citizens of Pittsburg, the citizens of Harrisburg, the citizens of Baltimore, and the citizens and residents of Washington, seem all equally alarmed at the movements of Lee, and at each city the inhabitants are led to believe that his designs are against them. He will do what he can to keep up that terror by occupying a central position. But it is evident that, considering the difficulty of capturing Harrisburg, with the wide Susquehanna between him and it, and how little that city would repay him for the operation, he has no serious designs on the capital of Pennsylvania. Neither is it at all probable that he will attack Baltimore, as it is very certain he could not hold it, with Fort McHenry in the possession of the Union troops and the city accessible to our gunboats. He might destroy it; but, as at least three-fourths of the population sympathize with the rebellion, he could have no adequate motive in striking such a blow. But what he is far more likely to do is this: to cut the railroad communication between Philadelphia and Baltimore, and between Harrisburg and Baltimore, and also between Baltimore and Washington, thus isolating the two latter cities from the West, the Baltimore and Ohio road having been already destroyed from Harper’s Ferry to Cumberland. And it is probable that this is the real object of the raids in the direction of Pittsburg and Harrisburg. Without taking a man from the army under his own immediate command, which, it is said, numbers one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, he can employ in this business the independent force which roamed over Western Virginia before he arrived, under Jones, Jenkins and Imboden, numbering nine thousand men; and, in point of fact, it is a small part of this force that, under the protection of the army of Lee, has hitherto created all the consternation in Harrisburg and other parts of Pennsylvania. Lee himself will probably soon occupy Frederick or some central point between Baltimore and Washington, thus compelling Hooker to come out and fight him, under pain of being isolated from East, North and West – every point of the compass except the sea; and from that, too, no doubt, he would ultimately attempt to cut him off by establishing heavy batteries on the Lower Potomac. Meantime we shall probably soon hear of the capture of Maryland Heights and the inadequate force which holds it.
Thus does the second campaign in Maryland develop itself. Its crisis cannot be far distant. The most tremendous consequences are involved. Lee has again crossed the Rubicon. Should he be again defeated, and that decisively, it will be the death blow of the rebellion, and the whole concern will suddenly collapse. But if Hooker should be defeated, and Washington captured, the hopes of the confederacy would be revived, and no mortal man can predict what grave results might follow such a catastrophe.