January 25, 1861; The Charleston Mercury
(From the Mobile Advertiser.)
Popular interest in warlike movements now centres nearer at home than when Charleston was the only point from which radiated the war excitements of the day. The immense interest of at least three States – Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida – is now becoming alive to the importance of occupying the forts within the borders of the latter commonwealth. We see repeated at Pensacola the manoeuvre of Anderson at Moultrie. There are three forts at Pensacola, a Navy Yard, and a redoubt. Commander Armstrong has abandoned the Navy Yard and Fort Barancus, removing munitions, and spiking guns, and transferring his forces, amounting in the aggregate to between two and three hundred men, from the main land to Santa Rosa Island, has prepared to make good his position within the immensely strong fortifications of Fort Pickens. Whether he has abandoned Fort McCree, also, we are not advised, but we doubt if he has. This fortress is a powerful and castle-like masonry erection, built on a low sand pit of the main land, and appearing to rise out of the water. It is further seaward than Fort Pickens, of which it is the vis a vis across the channel, and a vessel entering must needs run the gauntlet of its guns before approaching the latter, which, however, of itself effectually closes the harbor against the admission of an enemy of even very heavy force.
Fort Pickens is designed to mount no less than two hundred and twelve guns, and under the protection of it immense batteries the ships of an enemy could make good their harbor in the Bay of Pensacola, or if they did not care to run the risk from shore batteries, which could not be in very dangerous range, they could land forces and supplies on the fort to the eastward of Santa Rosa Island, which is some forty miles long, and thus throw in reinforcements and rendezvous even an army at the fort without interruption, unless of a force intrenched on the Island itself, in the rear of the fort – which, however, is almost if not quite as defensible from rear as front. If we are to have war, the seizure of this stronghold is, of course, of the first importance, for unless it is occupied by us, it will secure to the enemy a base of operations along our whole gulf coast, and keep open a road right in the heart of the South, which cannot be obstructed by any fixed fortifications. Once within the gates of the harbor, and an army could be disembarked at any point on the wide bay which it might select. It could run up beyond the Escambia river and land many hours ahead of any opposing force which might be at Pensacola; beside placing a wide river between it and the latter – or even two rivers, the Escambia and Blackwater – by going far enough up. Hence, with a start of at least forty-eight hours, it could march into Interior Alabama. An enemy holding Fort Pickens could rendezvous a naval force there and keep up a blockade of all the ports of the Gulf unless we could meet it on the sea.