May 9, 1863, The New York Herald
The Secretary of War, in his despatch of yesterday to the Governor of Pennsylvania, says that although principal operations of General Hooker failed, there has been no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army;”that more than one-third of General Hookerforce was engaged;” that “General Stoneman’s operations have been a brilliant success,” and that Army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations.”
These official statements are encouraging if we may accept them as involving a new commander to the army; but otherwise they amount to nothing. Under the circumstances, it may be something to boast of that the army has suffered no serious disaster, and is still strong, compact and efficient; but no more damaging confession could be made in regard to General Hooker than that […..] more than one-third” of his army was engaged in all his three days’ battles around Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. In this fact alone it is evident that his army was two-thirds larger than his abilities to manage it. We would not be cruel towards General Hooker. He is sufficiently punished by his deplorable failure where he had promised and had the means and the opportunity for a glorious success. We may say, however, that in the division of his forces when he should had massed them against the enemy; in his movements to avoid a general engagement where he should have tried it; in fighting upon the defensive with only one-third of his forces, when he should have acted upon the offensive with his whole army; that in his delay to bring out the enemy after crossing the river, and in permitting them, en masse, to operate first upon one flank and then upon the other; and that, finally, in recrossing the river, when by the concentration of his columns the enemy dared not attack him, it is abundantly proved that General Hooker has neither the skill, the grasp of mind, nor the steadiness or self-possession which ought to belong to the commander of the Army of the Potomac.
So conclusively do we regard the facts against him that we take it for granted that General Hooker is to be set aside. He has had a fair trail, a splendid opportunity; he has signally failed, and simple justice to the brave army which he has so grievously disappointed demands his removal. Who, then, is the man to command the Army of the Potomac? General Sedgwick, with his detached corps, has done wonders; all the other corps commanders are so far as we known, entitled to honorable mention. General Butterfield, chief of General Hooker’s staff, appears to have distinguished himself only in keeping out of range of the enemy’s fire. As for General Carl Schurz, that noisy politician, who brought disgrace upon his division of brave Germans, he is not fit to command anything, and ought to be turned adrift. What officer in the Army of the Potomac is the proper man to lead it?
The very interesting photographic details which we have published from our correspondents on the field of Saturday’s and Sunday’s engagements around Chancellorsville indicate the individual. General Daniel E. Sickles, commander of the Third Army corps, is that man. Had his advance upon the enemy on Saturday been promptly and strongly supported by General Hooker the stampede of the Eleventh corps might have been avoided, and the day might have closed with our army on the high road to a decisive victory. In all the details of Saturday’s and Sunday’s operations the reader will perceive that General Sickles displayed that quickness of perception, that promptness in action, and that never failing self-possession which distinguish the great commander. Against the possible objection that he has had no education at a military academy, we need only say that Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, General Washington, General Jackson, General Scott, and a host of other distinguished military chieftains of the past and the present, may be placed in the same category. Active campaigning is the school in which the man of true military genius soon learns more of the art of war than can be gained by most men in a lifetime at West Point.
We despair of that complete reorganization of the War Office and its system of warfare which is so much demanded to overthrow the armies of the rebellion. We fear that President Lincoln’s amiable weakness for Stanton and Halleck is a weakness which cannot be shaken. We presume that pride of opinion will settle the case against McClellan; that no other general who has been tried and dropped will be taken up again to command the Army of the Potomac, and we conclude that, with the dropping of Hooker, some other officer of his army will be appointed in his place. We therefore would call the attention of President Lincoln to General Sickles as the man for this position, for he has shown in the recent nine days’ campaign on the Rappahannock the skill and coolness of a great commander in the hour of action and the crisis of danger.