June 15, 1863, The New York Herald
About two years ago General Scott started grand army of the United States “on its march southward, by way of Virginia, to occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government,” and to take care that […..] laws of the Union should be faithfully executed in all the States.” Since that we have had a succession of battles, of greater or less extent, with advances and retreats innumerable, and not less than half a million men have been lost to the country in all ways. After so much endeavor, in what position is the war?
Practically we may now consider the rebellion as represented by about three hundred and fifty thousand effective soldiers. Aside from its armies, the rebellion has no vitality, and those armies are consequently the true objective points. They are in the field at Fredericksburg, Petersburg and Staunton, in Virginia; at Goldsboro and Wilmington, in North Carolina; at Charleston, in South Carolina; at Savannah, in Georgia; at Tallahassee, in Florida; at Monticello, in Kentucky; at Knoxville, Shelbyville and Chattanooga, in Tennessee; at Madison, Jacksonport and Little Rock, in Arkansas; at Mobile, at Port Hudson and at Vicksburg.
Though we have thus named eighteen points, the force at some of them is quite small, and might, for any importance in the points themselves, be smaller; for the whole struggle is now concentrated really in five theatres of operations, and the theatres of primary importance are fewer still; for the positions at Goldsboro and Wilmington are merely the acknowledgment of a weakness there, and the positions at Petersburg and Staunton are of equally small account – certainly the latter. Marmaduke’s position at Madison, in Arkansas, and Pegram’s at Monticello, in Kentucky, both depend – like the fortunes of the celebrated Guppy – upon […..] over which they have no control.” Those positions will be fought for on other fields. Fredericksburg, Vicksburg, the centre of the line between these two in Tennessee, and the position at Charleston – which practically may be counted as one with that at Savannah – are the great points, the points at which the war appears to culminate. In fact, the rebellion may be regarded as drawn up on one immense field. It faces to the northwest and its rear rests upon the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. Lee holds the right above Richmond; Johnston and Pemberton between them hold the left at Vicksburg; Bragg and Buckner hold the centre, and the reserve, under Beauregard, is at Savannah and Charleston, ready to be sent anywhere, and in a position to guard the approaches in that direction, if indeed this reserve has not already been sent elsewhere.
Against the rebel right, as thus indicated, we have hitherto directed our main effort neither well nor wisely – not for any good reason, since it is not a decisive point, either topographically or strategically. In this we have been governed by a vague notion that we ought to take the enemy capital. But the Southern States are not France – they have no Paris. They have no capital except as they choose to name a town as a place of assembly for their rulers. Richmond was probably designated as the seat of government to invite advance in that direction, and to keep the war as much as possible in Virginia and out of the States more deeply interested in the contest. As for the prestige we might gain by the capture of a enemy’scapital, it is not an equivalent for the loss of sixty thousand men. Yet with the Bull run campaign, the peninsular campaign, Pope’s impotent attempt, Burnside’s repulse and Hooker’s horrible catastrophe, we have lost at least that many in the attempt, and still the rebel right is essentially where it was. All that we have done against it has been to the advantage of the rebels, and the prestige, which was more to them than to us, is all theirs.
Against their centre we have had more success. By the operations in Western Virginia, and from the capture of Fort Donelson onward, we have pushed it, with varying fortunes, to the northern line of the Gulf States, and it rests not far north of that. Every great battle fought there has been completely in our favor. Hooker and Rosecrans now respectively watch these points on the right and centre. Their business is to stand still, perhaps to threaten – but above all to hold fast. Hooker is perhaps soon to be tried again. It is for him to see that the rebel right, under Lee, does not advance into the free States and achieve the success by which it expects to balance the disaster that is to fall upon it in the West. Rosecrans, who is a hard fighter, without a soubriquet, and who has plenty of brains, without pretence, will do his part with quiet tenacity.
Upon the rebel left we began our operations well with Captain Nathaniel Lyon, who would have closed up matters in that direction very shortly if he had been given the entire command there. But the romantic tastes of the period had to be pandered to, and Lyon, who was not at all romantic, gave way to Fremont, who was. Then followed an avalanche of errors. Fremont was swept from his official feet at last, and the enemy was driven from Missouri, beaten at Pea Ridge, and now stands at bay by the “City on the Hill,” where he holds with almost the power of despair his last point on the Mississippi river. General Grant has thus far acted against Vicksburg with great boldness and ability. Let him but continue his campaign in the spirit in which it has been so far carried on, and Vicksburg will be ours, and the rebellion will lose by that one blow half of its already small territory. Banks’ operations further down the river – though for the present dwarfed in public estimation by the apparently greater operations of Grant – are nevertheless of the first importance, as in any event they deprive the rebellion of an immense territory and of great material wealth. Grant, however, has in his hands the great game in the Southwest. Let him but win, and Rosecrans and Hooker meanwhile hold their places and from the hour when Vicksburg is ours we may date the downfall of the rebellion. Charleston and the position in East Tennessee will then, with Richmond, be the points of importance and the great Southern confederacy will be reduced to a convenient size.
Already we have achieved a great deal. Maryland, Delaware and Kentucky assured; Missouri, Tennessee and half of Virginia redeemed; Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana and half of Florida essentially in our possession; a slice of North Carolina ours, and Mississippi in the balance – such are the results; and yet the miserable partisan spouters tell their audiences that we are no nearer to the end of the war than we were two years ago. From the glance we have given, any one not blinded by party zeal may see that, though fewer brilliant victories have been gained than were expected, we have made steady and great progress towards the accomplishment of the objects of the war, and are now in the position to strike a blow that will do it more harm than any one blow has yet done.
So much for the territorial aspects of the situation; but, as we have said above, the rebel armies are now the important objective points. Here also our progress has been great; for the rebellion in this respect is in such a position that at any one of the three points – right, left or centre – we are able to strike almost at it life; and the overthrow of a rebel army at any one of these points would now be vastly more disastrous to the rebellion than it could have been at this time last year.