May 12, 1863, The New York Herald
The late catastrophe on the Rappahannock is full of instruction, if the authorities at Washington could only profit by it and amend their ways. The criticism on the battle by Mr. Emil Schalk, in the letter which we published on Sunday, is well deserving of attention. This gentleman evidently understand his subject, and has a military mind of no common order. He is the author of “Campaigns of 1862 and 1863, Illustrating the Principles of Strategy,” a book which ought to be in the hands of all our generals. His comments on the recent fight on the Rappahannock are well reasoned. He classes it among other battles fought during this war, in which thousands and thousands of brave soldiers are immolated, without any adequate result for the enormous loss of life, and which may be traced directly to the mistakes of the generals commanding. Of the rebel general he says: “General Lee has certainly gained for himself by this battle the name of one of the ablest generals of the present age;” while of Hooker he remarks: – “The idea of a general who is on the offensive, whose avowed object is the capture or destruction of a whole army, making six miles in thirty-six hours, just at the most critical moment of his operations, and finally, after intrenching himself without being on the communications of his enemy, tells his soldiers that the enemy has to run away or to attack him on his own ground, where he will destroy him, has not its parallel in modern times.”
These observations are undoubtedly just; but there is one point on which we do not agree with Mr. Schalk. It is his depreciation of the movement of Stoneman. If Hooker had not enough of troops without this large cavalry force, there might be some force in the objection; but when we are told by Mr. Stanton that only one-third of his men were brought into action, the case is entirely altered. It is true, perhaps, that all Stoneman’s cavalry were not needed to cut Lee communications and cooperate with the Union troops in North Carolina and those under General Dix in capturing Richmond. But Stoneman’s operations were singularly successful; and had our infantry force in the vicinity of James river been equally enterprising, or had Hooker done his duty on the Rappahannock, Richmond, Fredericksburg and the whole of Lee’s army would have been captured together. The plan, as we understand it, was to hold Lee in check by means of Hooker’s army, if it was not possible to defeat him in a pitched battle, while Stoneman and the forces in Southern Virginia and North Carolina combined their operations against the rebel capital. The plan was good, and only failed in the execution from the inefficiency of the generals. Sedgwick, too, did his duty and behaved nobly; but he was not supported by Hooker, and his corps was consequently victimized.
It is worthy of remark that Lee did not attack Hooker on Monday or Tuesday. Why? Because Jeff. Davis sent the rebel general a message that his communications were cut off, and also made a demand upon him for troops to save Richmond. Lee was only too glad, therefore, to let Hooker cross the river as soon as possible, lest he should find out what had been done. Hooker might have known that Lee had some peculiar motive for his apparently strange course, and he ought to have held his ground, and, if Lee attempted to retreat, hung upon his rear. Thus was the campaign lost, and with it hecatombs of human beings sacrificed in vain.
In the campaign of the last year time was wasted and prestige lost because those who directed it did not understand the principles of the art of war. We had hoped that the inauguration of the coming campaign would mark the dawn of a new era, and that the military operations of the generals of the Union would be conducted thenceforth in conformity with those maxims and rules which cannot be violated with impunity. Had true military ideas prevailed there would be no necessity for an attack on Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Charleston or Richmond. With the success of our main armies in the field, these places would have fallen without a blow. Without the destruction of the principal armies of the enemy in decisive battles, the capture of Richmond, Charleston, Mobile, Vicksburg, and other cities similarly situated, would avail little towards the overthrow of the rebellion or towards bringing the war to a successful issue. Mismanagement and incapacity have blundered at every step since the struggle began.
In the war of the Revolution great ability was displayed in the field as well as in politics by the same men. The generals were all statesmen and men of character and mark. Hence their success. The same cause operated to the triumph of the Roman arms. Superior men ruled the country and led the armies by turns. In the next generation after the American Revolution a race of statesman succeeded to Washington and the rest; but they displayed no aptitude for military affairs, probably because there was no scope for the exercise of such talents. In the present time we have neither statesmen nor generals, but for the most part a set of small men who play at soldiers, and play at politics with equal ignorance and stupidity. The consequence is that everything has gone wrong. The only man who has shown ability in war, or who appears to have understood the business he undertook, is General McClellan, whose plans and purposes have been defeated by jealous rivals and party politicians of very small calibre. The idea of some of our generals has been simply to kill or be killed, without considering what benefit is to result from the slaughter. Such fighting can never achieve the object of the war. A French general who saw Lord Cardigan make the famous charge upon the Russian batteries at Balaklava exclaimed, “It is magnificent, but it is not war.” And so the attempt of Burnside to storm the heights of Fredericksburg; that of DuPont, under orders from Washington, to capture Charleston with a few iron-clads, and the folly of Sherman running his head against Haines’ bluff, like a mad bull against the wall, may be grand displays of courage; but such is not war in the scientific sense of the term. In like manner the strategy of Hooker is at fault in his late attempt to advance again Richmond via Fredericksburg…. So long as communication is open between these three armies, and they can reinforce each other at will and form a junction of them if necessary or desirable they possess the interior lines; while, on the other hand, our army on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, our army at Norfolk, Suffolk and in North Carolina, and our army at Murfreesboro, have exterior lines, because they have to no communication with each other, cannot reinforce each other, and are liable to be crushed separately by the united force of three rebel armies. If either or all the Confederate armies are pressed they can retreat till the effect of a junction, by which they can first deal a deadly blow to one hostile army, and then the other. The only way that this result could be prevented is to have each of our armies superior in numbers to the whole force of the enemy combined, or, if that is impracticable then to refuse to give him battle except on the side that he is weakest. Napoleon, who always sought interior lines, was once baffled by this cautious method adopted by the Allies, and the disastrous defeat of Leipsic was the consequence. That, however, does not detract from the general advantages of interior lines, which are necessarily shorter, in addition to rapidity of movement being augmented in the South by the use of railroads.
If the vigilance of Wellington and the energy of Blucher had not prevented Napoleon gaining the interior lines by their falling back so as to effect a junction he would have whipped both generals in succession. Now if our generals could only gain the interior by a flank movement, staying, say, from Port Royal, in South Carolina or from the Ohio, and occupying either Knoxville and Cleveland, Tenn. or Lynchburg, Va., what a fluttering there would be of the Confederate dovecote – the rebel army and rebel territory divided, and the enemy without even command of the sea to remedy the disaster. But if half the time and energy had been concentrated on this that has been spent in vain, isolated efforts upon the capture of cities on the external boundaries of the confederacy which are of no strategical importance whatsoever, it would have been accomplished long since, and the greatest results would have followed.
War – especially war on a large scale – is a science, and if it is not conducted in a scientific manner failure must be the consequence. The Confederate troops fight equally well with our own, and the rebellious armies therefore can only be overthrown by the science which can bring to bear upon the decisive point of the theatre of operations a much larger force than the enemy. This is most easily done by internal lines. Napoleon’s usual plan of winning a decisive battle, after by his strategy he had compelled the enemy to fight when he wanted him, was to penetrate his line between one of the wings and the centre, and, thus dividing it, to attack and defeat each in succession with his whole force. The same rule applies to the whole theatre of war. By getting interior lines and a central position the enemy’s armies may be all beaten in detail. Then there is a vast difference between winning a battle after it has been brought on by strategic marches and winning it without strategy. For instance, if Burnside had won the first battle of Fredericksburg the victory might have proved of small account; for the enemy could have fallen back to other defences, and have lived to fight another day. But suppose that by some skilful manoeuvering Burnside had got south of the rebel army, and compelled it to fight with its back to the north in that event, if it were defeated, it would be utterly destroyed, as it would have no place of safety upon which to retreat, with its communications, reinforcements and supplies all cut off. Had Hooker held Chancellorsville and defeated Lee the battle would have been decisive, because Lee could not retreat south, and his army would have been lost. But Hooker did not make the right use of the means at his command to achieve the victory. Sometimes a general who is trying to accomplish such grand results is accused of tardiness by those who are as ignorant of his purpose as they are of the elements of the art of war, and because he does not publish his plan they foolishly imagine he has no plan at all.
In two publications Mr. Schalk has applied these principles to the campaigns of 1862 and 1863. His books, though giving evidence of a thorough knowledge of his subject, are not written in a learned, technical style, such as could be understood only be educated military men, but in a popular, familiar manner, and with such clear ideas that […..] who runs may read.”
Our greatest want is the want of a good general-in-chief at Washington. As this critic truly observes, in his letter on the late battle on the Rappahannock, it would be wrong to make General Hooker alone responsible for his defeat. General Halleck ought to be strictly held to account. But, Mr. Schalk asks: –
How could reasonable action be expected from a general-in-chief who advanced against Corinth with a snail-like pace to undertake the siege of field works which the rebels afterwards, under Van Dorn, did not hesitate a moment to storm; and who sent Pope with 30,000 men to capture an army which he with 100,000 could not defeat? It is the same general who, in August last, gave General Burnside the strange order to stay quietly at Fredericksburg with his troops. Meanwhile Pope was defeated at Manassas. The same who ordered Pope to retreat toward Washington instead of ordering him to retreat toward Salem and Berlin, which would have prevented the battle at Manassas and the invasion of Maryland. It is the same who gave the fatal order to Colonel Miles to hold Harper’s Ferry when the rebels were already in Maryland, and when thereby Harper’s Ferry had lost all importance. Have there not been useless butcheries and failures of operation enough to warrant finally the adoption of sound military plans?
This is a question for the consideration of the head of the War Department, and of the President, who by the constitution is made the legal and responsible Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. It is to be hoped that a new leaf will be turned, and that a fatal blow will be struck in Virginia or Tennessee, or both, before the warm weather paralyzes military operations.