February 28, 1863, The Charleston Mercury
We publish, by request, the following article from the Richmond Dispatch, in regard to the loss of New Orleans. For our own part, we have never been able to gather the data necessary to form a satisfactory opinion as to who is responsible for that grievous disaster. It is high time, we think, that the matter should be thoroughly sifted, and the people informed whether the fall of the Crescent City is due to the shortcomings of the army, or of the navy, or of the government.
HOW NEW ORLEANS WAS TAKEN – A YANKEE OPINION OF THE SUPINENESS OF OUR NAVAL OFFICERS.
The capture of the Harriet Lane has brought to light a correspondence showing that New Orleans might easily have been held by the Confederates, and that the dash of the Federal vessels was a last and desperate move on the part of the bombarding forces, the success of which surprised even its projectors themselves. The Houston Telegraph of the 16th ult. contains a letter written by Commander Wainwright, of the steamer Harriet Lane, to Commander D. D. Porter, relating to the Confederate defence of New Orleans, and how that city was taken by the Federals. It will be seen from the extract we give below that Commander Wainwright regards their success as owing mainly to the […..] of our naval officers:
U. S. STEAMSHIP HARRIET LANE,
SHIP ISLAND, June 1, 1862.
SIR: In reply to your communication of the 29th ult., I have to state that on the afternoon of April 22d, a signal was made from the flagship Hartford for all commanding officers to repair on board. Though not positive that the signal was intended to apply to the officers attached to the mortar flotilla, I determined to present myself in obedience thereto, which I accordingly did. I found assembled all the commanding officers of the fleet, with the exception of those attached to the mortar flotilla, myself being the only representative of that branch of the squadron. Upon repairing to the cabin of the flag officer, I was laughingly told that I was looked upon as an outsider, and that the signal was not meant for me. Perhaps it would have been more delicate in me to have retired, but as I felt that the object of the meeting had a common interest for all, I determined to remain, supposing that no objection to my presence could exist, admitting that there was no necessity for it.
The flag officer then proceeded to state the reason why the officers had been summoned, which was to give his plan for passing the forts, and the disposition he proposed to make of the forces under his command. He premised by saying that Captain Porter had submitted a plan of operations which embraced ideas similar to his own, and with which he entirely agreed. He then continued to state his plans, and invited the opinion of the officers there assembled. The prevailing feeling seemed to be adverse to making the attempt to pass the forts at that time; that it was premature; that the forts had not been sufficiently reduced by the fire of the mortar vessels, and that the risk of the loss of many of the vessels was too great to run. The question was freely asked, why the mortar vessels could not continue the bombardment for a length of time, the idea of which appeared to be rather indefinite, unless it was expected that the reduction of the forts should be owing to the force of the mortar vessels entirely, when the ships would be able to pass in comparative safety.
The Flag Officer said he agreed in the main with what had been said; but that Captain Porter urged very strongly the attempt being made on the ground of its probable success, but from the fact that not only the fire of the mortar vessels could not be sustained for a much longer period; that the ammunition was becoming scarce and difficult to supply, the vessels shaken by the constant concussion, and the men fagged out with a continued bombardment, which had already lasted for more than four days and three nights. On these accounts, the Flag Officer said he had determined to make the attack the same night. In conclusion, you ask my opinion whether you were justified by results in advocating so strenuously the advance of the fleet, and what might or would have been the result had your counsel, which was deemed premature, been disregarded. Having been more intimately associated with you, and probably more conversant with your plans and expectations than any other in the squadron, I am enabled to say that the brilliant result most completely vindicated the wisdom of your counsel and the soundness of your views. By the light of knowledge obtained subsequent to the surrender of the forts, it is plain that delay in the attack would have been fatal to us. Had the defence been as vigorously and gallantly conducted by the naval portion of the forces, opposed to us as it was by the army, the chances are that the mortar vessels would have been obliged to retire before the fire of the iron clad battery Louisiana, which was to have taken up a raking position below the water battery of Fort St. Philip, and under the protection of the guns of both forts. Fortunately for us, the supineness of the rebel naval officers left us undisturbed; but it cannot be conceived had the attack been delayed a day or so longer that the enemy would have failed to make use of so formidable an adjunct to his means of defence.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. M. WAINWRIGHT,
Lieutenant Commanding.
Commander DANIEL D. PORTER, U. S. N.,
Commanding Mortar Flotilla.
While on this subject, we give an extract from the Message of Governor Moore, of Louisiana, to the Legislature, regarding the same affair. After giving a history of the efforts to prepare for a naval attack on the forts, etc., he says:
The Louisiana was at length started for the forts on the afternoon of the 20th, but with her prow unadjusted, her armament incomplete and her machinery untested. On the same day I had telegraphed to General Duncan, offering to supply whatever was in my power, and suggesting the use of sand bags for the protection of the fort, which I offered to furnish. He at once accepted the offer, and the following morning I despatched a steamer with five thousand to the fort. On the next succeeding day I wrote to the chief officers of State, suggesting that the records of their offices and all the archives of State be put in a condition to admit of their removal at a few hours’ notice.
A telegram from General Duncan, at 40 minutes past 10 a.m., of the 23d, gave an encouraging and hopeful account of their condition, considering that 22,000 to 25,000 thirteen inch mortar shells had been fired by the enemy, of which […..] had fallen within the fort. Fearing that this despatch, which General Duncan had requested to be published, was intended mainly to allay the apprehensions of the citizens, and being informed by one of my officers, whom I had sent to the forts to ascertain their condition, that they were seriously injured, and that the navy had lent them no assistance, I immediately telegraphed the General a request to inform me the exact condition of things. His answer at 6 p.m., of the same day, was, navy has lent me no assistance whatever up to this hour, and we cannot get them to place the Louisiana in position. They say they will do so tomorrow night. I am much obliged for your kindly offer, but we want nothing. The fear we have is that in a general engagement some of the vessels may get by. ‘Tomorrow night’ was too late. Ten hours after that despatch was received, the fear that some of the vessels would get by was realized.