July 1, 1863, The New York Herald
The movements of the rebels yesterday in Pennsylvania, so far as reported, show that they have found the Susquehanna river an obstruction which it would be unwise to attempt to pass, and that they are gradually falling back to provide against the contingencies of a movement upon their flank or rear by the army of General Meade.
We conclude, from the facts before us, that the bulk of the rebel army is now within the limits of the Cumberland valley (which is but a continuation of the Shenandoah valley), and that the line occupied by the rebel forces extends from Carlisle southwestwardly to the borders of the narrow northern neck of Maryland, a distance of about fifty miles. We guess that the corps of Longstreet, which is said to embrace one-half of Lee’s whole force, extends from Chambersburg to Hagerstown, a distance of about twenty miles; that A. P. Hill’s corps is east of Hagerstown, extending the Gettysburg, while Ewell’s advanced corps is at Carlisle. We have no doubt that the foraging detachments from these several divisions of the rebel army have made good use of their time in cleaning out the country in every direction north of the Potomac, from Shepherdstown to the Susquehanna, near Harrisburg — a distance of some eighty or ninety miles — while from west to east in Pennsylvania their depredations have extended over the same breadth of land. How many millions of dollars in horses, harness, wagons, cattle, sheep, swine, pork, bacon, breadstuffs, salt, shoes, groceries, medicines, dry goods, hardware, &c., and forced contributions in money, have thus been appropriated by the rebels we have no mode of estimating. We apprehend, however, from the significant suggestions thrown out by the Richmond Enquirer in its leading editorial on the subject, which we publish this morning, that the work of spoliation and devastation of this rebel army in Pennsylvania will in reality only begin with its retreat.
The Enquirer, which is understood to be the official organ of the rebel government, very broadly intimates that it is the game of Lee, while advancing into Pennsylvania, to amuse the natives with a magnanimous forbearance — to play with them as a cat plays with a mouse — to deceive them with the idea that they are not to be robbed to any great extent; but that when Lee returns his march, by way of retaliation, will be marked by universal plundering and destruction. The forced contributions levied upon the little city of York show that the Enquirer, in the leading article in question, spoke by authority. With the return of the rebel army, therefore, to Virginia, unless precipitately driven back, we may anticipate a schedule of losses of property to the suffering Pennsylvanians amounting to many millions in value beyond the present conjectures of our own people outside the district now infested by the enemy.
We attach no great importance to the raids from the little rebel cavalry squads in the direction of Baltimore. They are reconnoitering parties feeling about for the army of General Meade, while Lee is holding his forces in convenient positions for concentration in the event of a battle, and for a safe exit out of Pennsylvania and Maryland in the event of a defeat. He evidently has his misgivings as to his ability to cope with our Army of the Potomac, or he would not have lost so much valuable time in bringing it to an engagement. In coming, however, around from Fredericksburg one hundred and fifty miles, over an exhausted country on short rations, his first necessities were supplies for his needy army. He has been collecting and sending them back to Charlestown and Winchester in immense wagon trains, in addition to the quantities retained for immediate use. If Lee should, therefore, be driven back into the Shenandoah valley, unless thoroughly defeated, he will probably have gained from this campaign six months’ subsistence for his army — an amount which even the Shenandoah valley, stripped of two-thirds of its able bodied field hands, white and black, could not afford without inflicting great suffering upon its people.
Our Army of the Potomac, if equal in numbers is superior in strength to the army of Lee. The records of all the operations of this war in Virginia and Maryland establish this fact. But we believe that even in numbers the army which General Meade is now moving upon the enemy is immensely stronger than that of Lee supposing him to be at the head of a hundred thousand men. We do not believe, however, that Lee’s army can exceed seventy-five thousand men; and from all the latest reported movements of his forces, we judge that he is more anxious to get safely back into the Shenandoah valley with his plunder than to try the issue of a pitched battle with General Meade. The events of the passing day may change these aspects of the situation; but from present appearances Lee is moving, not to meet, but honestly to avoid, the Army of the Potomac.