April 11, 1863, The New York Herald
We receive by way of Richmond a brief account of the results of the first day’s operations of our iron-clads against the forts in Charleston harbor. At first view they would appear to be rather unfavorable to us. According to the rebel statement, the attack commenced on the morning of the 7th, when four of the Monitors opened fire; in the afternoon eight of our Monitors, with the Ironsides, opened fire on Fort Sumter. At half-past two the firing became incessant on both sides, the three principal forts concentrating their guns upon our fleet, and about five o’clock it gradually diminished, and soon after ceased. It is stated that two of our vessels – the Keokuk and the Ironsides – were disabled in the fight, and that the former lies sunk on the beach off Morris Island. The Ironsides was got off and taken out of range. There was no renewal of the attack on the following day, at least up to the period of the transmission of the despatch. It is added, however, that seven of our turreted iron-clads and the Ironsides were still within the bar, while a blockading force of twenty-two more of our vessels lay outside.
This statement of the affair, taken without the accompanying facts, would lead to the inference that our fleet had met with a serious check. We are satisfied, however, that it will be found that the result of the demonstration of the 7th does not deserve this character, and that it was intended merely as a feeler of the enemy’s batteries. There are two circumstances that would go to establish this assumption. It is mentioned that the distance at which our vessels opened fire was three thousand yards, and that it was continued only for three hours. Now, as there was nothing to prevent our ironclads approaching within three thousand yards of Fort Sumter, and as three hours’ firing could not possibly exhaust their supplies of ammunition, it is clear that the object of the attack could only have been to draw the fire of the enemy and to try the breaching power of our own guns. The injuries received by the Ironsides and the Keokuk are no doubt exaggerated; but in any case they would not have furnished a sufficient reason for the suspension of the assault after so brief a duration. At no time has any great dependence been placed by naval men on either of these vessels.
But, taking the news in its worst possible aspect, it ought not to surprise or discourage any one. The ostensibly formidable preparations which the government has been making for the reduction of Charleston have had the effect of stimulating the rebels to strain every effort for their defeat, and for the last year and a half the best engineers and artillery officers in their service have been expending all the resources which they could command for the defence of both the city and harbor. The result is that whilst on our side we have only brought the thirty-two guns of our iron-clads to the assault, they have between three and four hundred pieces in position on the different forts and floating batteries, including a number of the famous Whitworth and Armstrong cannon, imported from England. With such facts before us, we should not feel discouraged by these rebel accounts, or if our present efforts against the place were not to meet with immediate success. The affair of the 7th, of which the Richmond papers make so much account, must not, however, be looked upon as any indication of failure. As we have shown, it was merely intended as a feeler of the strength of the enemy batteries, a preliminary without which no experienced naval commander would commence an assault of such magnitude and risk.
In whatever light, however, the affair of the 7th is to be regarded, it ought not and must not be allowed to affect the ultimate result. Places like Charleston and Vicksburg are not to be reduced in a day, and it is the duty of the government to concentrate all its available resources for such efforts. Congress has invested it with enormous powers, given it a conscription law which places at its disposal the whole military strength of the country, and furnished it with money sufficient to meet all the demands that the war can entail upon it for the next couple of years. Under such circumstances it must know no such word as fail, it must recognize no such phrase as impossible. Let no military or naval operation be undertaken when there is reason to believe that our means are insufficient to insure the object aimed at. The prestige of frequent success is better than that of great victories alternated with reverses. With the resources we possess, even temporary defeat entails lasting disgrace and humiliation.