February 5, 1863, The New York Herald
The news which we published yesterday of the successful raid of the rebel iron-clads against our blockading force at Charleston is, so far as the number and value of the federal vessels destroyed are concerned, of but very little moment. The moral effect of the reverse, however, is very great. It is a humiliation to our navy that will be made the most of by those hostile to us, and that could never have occurred if ordinary foresight and vigilance had been observed.
But it is not merely in relation to this point that we regard this affair as a very serious disaster. It is the principle of international law involved in it that imparts to its gravity. We do not believe that it in reality affects the legal and permanent character of the blockade; but there is no doubt that it is intended to raise that issue with us. The simultaneous and temporarily successful efforts made at Galveston and Charleston to break the blockade, the proclamations issued by the rebel commanders at both places, formally declaring the consummation of the fact, and the endorsement by the foreign consuls of their proceedings, all go to show a preconcerted plan, undertaken either with or without an understanding with the European governments, but, in either case, pregnant with trouble to us. If any doubt existed on this point it would be removed by the declarations of the rebel journals. The Richmond Dispatch states that formal notice of the raising of the blockade at Charleston had been given by the rebel Secretary of State to the British and French consuls in Richmond, and that, by the strict rule of international law, sixty days’ notice must be given before it can be re-established. If this were so it would materially alter the character and probable duration of the war. Two months’ unobstructed commercial intercourse with Europe would place the South, both in regard to finances and war supplies, in a position infinitely stronger than that which it occupies at present. It would infuse fresh life and vigor into its military and naval operations, and render it, with its united sentiment, impossible to conquer.
We have no apprehension that the rebels will be able to establish legal grounds for what they claim. We have looked carefully through all the international authorities – extracts from which will be found in another column – and we can find nothing which, taken in conjunction with the real facts of the case, would go to show a legal raising of the blockade. Neither Ortolan nor Hautefeuille – the two standard writers on international law – contain anything which would go to prove that its temporary disturbance, without freedom of access and exit shown, would constitute such an interruption of it as would require the two months’ notice claimed by the rebels as necessary to its re-establishment. On the contrary, it will be found, by a passage which we quote from the latter writer, that express limits are set to the immunities of neutral vessels profiting by such disturbance, thereby showing that the resumption of the blockade is, within a reasonable time, at the option of the besieging fleet. It is true that the letter of Lord John Russell confirming the efficiency of the blockade, when, in February, 1861, the question was officially brought before him, may be made the foundation of a quibble in this regard. He says that, that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships are stationed and remain at the entrance of a port sufficient really to prevent access to it, or create an evident danger in leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily prevent egress or ingress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it will not of itself prevent the blockade from being and effective one by international law. It will be sought to show that no portion of our blockading force at Charleston at the entrance to that port after the affair in question, and that there was consequently no danger to neutral vessels in either entering or leaving it. In this view we can understand the stress laid by the rebels on the alleged fact that at a distance of five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockaders nothing was to be seen of them. For this statement, however, we have nothing but their own authority. If a neutral vessel had attempted either to enter or leave the port it is a question whether the blockading ships would not have quickly manifested their presence.
Apart from the discredit attaching to this unfortunate affair, the question involved in it is, as we have before observed, a very important one. All international authorities concede that the temporary withdrawal of a blockading force does not per se constitute the raising of a blockade. It is very essential that we should learn whether its being driven to some distance beyond its usual moorings is to be regarded in a different light. This, however, cannot be ascertained until we hear from the European governments interested in the decision of the point.
The worst that can befall us, supposing that decision to be adverse, will be, according to rebel statements, a raising of the blockade at Charleston for sixty days. In the meanwhile we can settle the question for ourselves by assaulting that hotbed of rebellion with such a force as will insure its speedy capture.