May 15, 1863, The New York Herald
The Army of the Potomac is re-established in its old quarters on this side of the Rappahannock, and the opposing rebel army has returned, in force, to the Heights of Fredericksburg, on the other side. Such are the latest advices from the field. The situation of the two armies is the same as before the late advance of General Hooker, and may perhaps remain so for some time to come.
It would thus appear that General Lee has sufficiently restored his communications with Richmond to feed his army, and has adopted the necessary precautions against any probable advance upon the city by way of the peninsula, while holding the main body of his forces in readiness for another trial of strategy and tactics with General Hooker. It is reported, however, that Lee’s plans now comprehend the removal of the bulk of his army to the railway junction near Hanover Court House, in the fork of the two main branches of the Pamunkey river, and about twenty-five miles from Richmond. For the purposes of watching the Rappahannock and our forces on the peninsula at the same time, and of guarding his communications and for securing supplies, no better position could be selected. From this point there are two distinct railroad lines to Richmond, one of which, at the junction, branches off west to Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and to Staunton, at the head of the Shenandoah valley, while the other goes due north to Fredericksburg.
It is probable, therefore, that the warning of General Stoneman’s late cavalry raid, and the danger to Richmond suggested by the presence of a considerable Union force on the peninsula, may induce General Lee to shift a large number of his troops to the point indicated, in order that they may be available against a Union advance from the Rappahannock or from Yorktown. The latest rumors, however, from the Rappahannock say that Lee is planting guns at the United States and Banks’ fords, from which it is inferred that he designs an offensive movement. We are satisfied that his only object in this proceeding is to guard the river against another crossing by our army. Lee’s opportunity was Hooker’s retreat, and when, with half or two-thirds of our forces on this side of the flooded stream, the work was still going on of bringing the remainder over on their two narrow pontoon bridges. A vigorous push at that moment en masse upon that portion of our army on the other side was the opportunity for Lee. In failing to seize it he confessed himself too much exhausted to attempt it. He was apprised of the movement on Sunday evening – it was not accomplished till Wednesday – he did not interrupt it. It is absurd, then, to suppose he has any idea of attempting to cross the river himself in the face of our whole army.
We are informed, on the other hand, that is quite certain that Gen. Hooker had ordered a portion of his army to recross the Rappahannock some days ago, in accordance with a plan framed before he commenced his retreat, but that the plan was not approved by General Halleck, who therefore countermanded it. “Hence,” we are further told, “ the conflict in the late reports concerning the recrossing of the river by Hooker.” This may be true; for we think it altogether likely that General Hooker’s failure had satisfied General Halleck that his proposed advance would end in another failure. In this connection we are inclined to believe another of these late Washington rumors, that seems not unlikely that General Halleck contemplates assuming the […..] command.”
Now, although General Halleck’s campaign at Corinth was not a very brilliant success, he crowded Beauregard out of his intrenchments without knowing it, and compelled him to leave. Should our General-in-Chief do the same thing for Lee, it will at least be an improvement upon the dashing advances of Burnside and Hooker and their unfortunate results. Perhaps, under all the circumstances, the readiest way for President Lincoln to settle the command of the Army of the Potomac may be in giving General Halleck a trial. Two officially authenticated facts settle the question against General Hooker – the fact that in all his three days battles only about one-third of his army was actually engaged, and the fact that in returning over the river, of which movement the rebels were fully informed, he was not interrupted. The first face proves that his capacities are not equal to the management of so large an army as that which he commanded, and the second that there was no necessity for his retreat.
We await the developments of the day. The Army of the Potomac, in order to resume offensive operations in complete condition, needs a little rest, some reinforcements, something, too, in the way of reorganization and a new leader. Unless the movements of the rebels, therefore, may require or invite a speedy resumption of active hostilities, we do not suppose that for some days or weeks to come this army will be again put in motion. From its late eventful campaign it comes off with the substantial fruits of success, while the enemy boasts a great victory, with nothing to show for it. As yet General Hooker is on this side of the Rappahannock. It is, perhaps, time for General halleck himself to assume the command; for he at least will not be disturbed by conflicting orders from Washington.