March 12, 1863, The Charleston Mercury
The shrewd correspondent of the Savannah Republican, ‘P.W.A.’ writing from this city on the 10th instant, says:
It is not probable that the enemy will abandon the Southern coast without making an attack upon Charleston of Savannah. Their expenditures of money have been too heavy, and their preparations too elaborate, to admit of such a supposition. Public opinion in the United States – […..] power behind the throne,’ which has had much to do in the conduct of the war on the other side – calls for the sacrifice of one or both of these cities, and a formidable effort will be made – probably within the next two weeks – to satisfy the demand.
There is a good reason, doubtless, for the hesitation which has characterized the movements of Gen. Hunter. First, his differences with General Foster as to the command of the Federal army, and next, the reports of spies and deserters as to the strength and character of our defences, have almost certainly operated to produce the delay. It is understood that there are five iron-clad vessels of the Monitor class now on the coast. These, it was feared, would not be sufficient to effect the reduction of either city, and three others – some say four – were sent for. It is for the arrival of the additional iron monsters that the enemy are waiting. One or two of them are reported to be now on the way to Port Royal.
Five of these Monitors – the number understood to be now on the coast – would be quite sufficient to protect the water base of any movement by land. Indeed, the wooden gunboats and other vessels of war now blockading this harbor, would be equal to that service. Why, then, should the enemy be waiting for additional iron-clads? There can be but one answer to this question? Their purpose is to operate by water. If Charleston is the point at which they are aiming, then they will enter the harbor and engaged the ports and batteries by which it is defended. They may even hope that the iron armor with which their vessels are protected, will enable them to run the gauntlet of the forts, and reach the city, as they did at New Orleans, and with like results. If Savannah is the goal of their ambition, then you may expect to see them steam up the river or some of the approaches to the city, and attempt to destroy the wards by which they are guarded. Having reached the city and brought it to terms, the land forces waiting below on the transports, will be taken up and put ashore.
If something like this be not their plan of operations, what then is it? And why should additional Monitors have been ordered out? The army at Hilton Head was as well prepared to move two weeks ago by land, as it will be two weeks hence. But it cannot move by land, if my information be correct, since it is not provided with sufficient transportation. It is not improbable that a preliminary movement will be made against Pocotaligo, or some other point on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, with a view to destroying the communications between the two cities; after which a descent will be made upon one of them, whilst a feint is made against the other; but beyond this, it is not likely that any operations will be attempted by land.
The late demonstrations against Genesis Point could not have been serious. Practice and a desire to see whether the number of guns in the fort had been increased, was probably the principal object of the expedition. A wish to create doubt on our part as to their movement, may have had something to do with it also. This does not detract anything, however, from the gallant conduct of the garrison on the occasion of the recent attack. Before the final attack begins, a serious effort may be made to reach the railroad bridge across the Ogeechee and destroy it.