June 18, 1863, The Charleston Mercury
On Friday, the 15th November, 1861, just after the fall of Hilton Head, we put forth the following editorial, submitting it to an eminent citizen of Charleston deemed most wise and most discreet. It was a calm, practical, common sense consideration of the evident dangers in view and of the manifest method of repelling them. The object was to give direction to the popular excitement, and to stimulate and encourage our military authorities in practical exertions for securing Charleston. Yet some persons did not like to look matters in the face. They feared the enemy might become aware of what every sensible man at all cognisant of our affairs, whether in or out of the harbor, knew perfectly well. They abused us roundly – were greatly alarmed at our […..].’ A few even stopped their subscriptions. But no harm resulted, and we flatter ourselves in the belief that the effect aimed at was produced. The work of preparation made decided progress, and events have justified, to a considerable extent, the good sense of our remarks, however unpalatable they may have been to some of our citizens. We are about to make more remarks, touching the necessity of present preparations, and our readers may peruse this extract before hearing what we have to say. We tell them plainly Charleston has yet to be saved from threatening dangers.
PREPARATION FOR OUR DANGERS.
The danger to Charleston, from the Yankee invaders, appears to be in three directions: First, from the passage of gunboats and light draft transports through the inland navigation. They command the communication by water, because we have no gunboats with 11 inch shell guns to meet their advance, and, if the communication is open, they might pass into Ashley River and shell Charleston. But it is not difficult to close this intricate and shallow passage. The sinking of a few hulks at the Church Flats and at Wappoo Cut would easily accomplish the object. It is quite possible, however, that the thoroughly equipped expedition may have anticipated such obstructions, and be prepared to blow up the hulks we may sink. It has been proved that powder, placed on the top of obstructions under water, by reason of the superincumbent pressure, is able to blow them to pieces, so that it would not be hard for the Yankees to rid themselves of our sunken vessels, provided they have safe access and sufficient time to operate with their submarine blasting contrivances. But a shore battery at these narrow approaches would suffice to keep them off, and thus effectually cut off their egress by inland navigation to Charleston.
The next point of danger to the city is James Island and its proximate shore opposite South Bay street. In the hands of the enemy, Charleston might be shelled from thence. Form Lighthouse Island beach the way is easy and short to James Island, and in a few hours an army might be landed on that beach. Or by taking island after island, Edisto and John Islands, the passage of a Yankee army to James Island by flat boats across Stono River would be secured, and nothing could prevent it but a strong force located on James Island, ready to resist such a passage. An entrenched camp and heavy forces stationed there, would enable us to get what we want – a battle on land. With these Charleston could not be taken until after a bloody pitched battle, in which we will never believe the Yankees can prevail.
The third quarter of attack is the deep waters of the harbor channel. Fortunately, the forty gun frigates, which have so recently demonstrated their powers in Port Royal, cannot get in, and the gunboats and smaller craft alone are capable of making the attempt. They must pass between the tremendous batteries of Forts Moultrie and Sumter, which have splendidly drilled artillerists to work and aim their formidable guns, possessing, too, the advantage of a plunging fire. The only danger here is, the enemy’s attempting to run the gauntlet in large numbers in the day, with the prospect of some boats getting through, or by sneaking in at night. To prevent the success of such attempts, obstructions have already been put across the channel, so as to detain the enemy long enough under the guns of the forts to blow them to pieces with shells, or fire them with hot shot. Fire ships, besides, are not forgotten. So long as these obstructions last, the foe are only in our net for bagging; but a great deal undoubtedly depends upon the ability of these obstructions to resist the weight of the Yankee flotilla, coming down upon them with tide and a full head of steam. Once withstand the shock and stop the headway, and the enemy are ours in such a game. Steel-clad gunboats, and all, at that short distance, under the plunging fire of such batteries, and such practical gunners as we possess, must come off second best, if they come off at all. The result, then, hangs very much upon the weight and strength of the impediments we have, and no time is to be lost in adding in every possible way to them, in these essential particulars.
Perhaps, in addition to these vital matters of prompt preparation, it might be a good precaution to obstruct the passage of the Ashley, by sinking one or two hulks in the narrow channel off the point of the Battery Garden. Gunboats could then, in no event, get round into Ashley River, and would be at least confined within the fire of Castle Pinckney, Fort Johnson, and a tier of guns along the East Bay Battery. Effective guns on Castle Pinckney, in such an event, would not be useless.
We throw out the above plain, common sense hints for what they may be worth. We have officers of high accomplishments, both of the Army and Navy, and skillful engineers, and having once decided upon the sources of danger, and our deficiencies, with the plans for meeting them, their work of preparation will, we doubt not, go rapidly on. The present is a time for decided action. With Generals Lee, Ripley and Trapier, with Captains Ingraham, Hartstein and Hamilton, we trust the tug of war will not come too soon for Charleston.