March 21, 1861; The New York Herald
WASHINGTON, March 19, 1861.
It is now over a week since the country was electrified by the announcement in the HERALD of the intention of the new administration to abandon Fort Sumter. When that humbling piece of intelligence first flashed over the land, a shock of indignant surprise was experienced throughout the republican North. Angry excitement and wrathful disappointment became manifest on all sides, and a sweeping storm of opposition appeared imminent. But a second sober thought prevailed in the end. Facts and figures benumbed the stinging sense of wounded pride and deep humiliation. Gradually, though reluctantly, the rank and file of the republicans grew reconciled to the idea of giving away for the nonce, from inexorable necessity to treason and rebellion. To be sure, to withdraw Major Anderson was to them like renouncing an article of their political faith, and abandoning the ardent hopes and recalling the fervent prayers of many months. Yet the dose of mortification, compounded for them by Mr. Lincoln’s predecessor, had to be swallowed, however large and bitter, and hence they set about preparing their minds for the emergency.
But, although the majority of Northern republicans are evidently ready for the consummation of what they have learned to consider inevitable–although they are ready to vouchsafe, if not their active approbation, at least the passive tolerance, of the most unpopular and yet necessitous step the government of their election could possibly take–they loathe to be kept on the rack of suspense. They intend to abide by the action of the new administration in the premises, but they desire it to act with promptness. They want to be rid of this demoralizing incubus at the earliest possible moment. They yearn to b relieved of the taunts, jeers and ridicule the sorry evaporation of their promises and pledges, boasts and threats, in regard to Fort Sumter have heaped upon them. They know that the only plausible argument in justification of its abandonment by order of the republican Executive was its and immediate necessity, and that it was losing force by every hour of delay. They feel that boldness of resolution and energy of execution are essentially indispensable qualities with those in power at the present juncture of public affairs, and hence they chafe under the indecision and procrastination that appear to characterize the first attempt of the new regime at the practical construction of the inaugural phrase ‘possess, hold and occupy the federal property.’
Diurnally for the last ten days the Cabinet has had protracted meetings. At every session, it is known, the question of what was to be done with Fort Sumter and the other posts in the seceded States still occupied by the federal troops unfailing came up, and was the subject of long and animated discussion. The counsels of such experts as Gen. Scott, Col. Totten, Prof. Bache, and other military and scientific eminences, were sought and obtained upon the weighty matter at issue. But although not only the President, but also every member of his ministerial council, yielded their political objections at an early moment, before the conclusive demonstrations by those authorities of the impracticability of a reinforcement, except at a fearful sacrifice of life and property, recognized the inevitability of an abandonment and determined then to submit to it, they concluded not to act upon the resolution.
The general impression appears to be that the evident hitch arrived at in the treatment of this subject is the result of indecision as to the mere determination to evacuate. But the real obstruction lies in a different direction. It is the question how to effect the withdrawal of Major Anderson and his small band with safety, and without compromising the honor and dignity of the federal government, too much of which will already be yielded by the surrender of its property and armaments to rebels and traitors. Still further, in deliberating upon this point an entirely new, and not the least perplexing, phase of this imbroglio presented itself to the Cabinet in the shape of authentic information that the commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces of the cotton confederacy had instructed General Beauregard not to allow the peaceful withdrawal of the garrison of Fort Sumter, without first obtaining by express stipulation security not only against all ruses, but also for the delivery of the post and all its appurtenances in an intact condition. This intention of the rebel chiefs to dictate terms to the legitimate government may be bold; but, unfortunately, they seem to have the power to realize it. Their command of all the inlets to Charleston harbor itself is so absolute that neither the safe approach of any federal vessel nor the safe embarkation of the garrison would be practicable without their consent. What, then, can the federal Executive do in case they shall presume, in their consciousness of the impracticability of a reinforcement and the impending reduction of the occupants of the post to the starvation point, to allow the evacuation upon the above conditions only? Nothing but either to bind itself by advance stipulations not to attempt a stealthy reinforcement while pretending to be about evacuating, not to spike the guns, and not to burn or blow up the fort, or surrender at discretion. As both horns of this dilemma imply an indirect recognition of, as well as a most humbling submission to, the revolutionary authorities, both the President and the Cabinet loathe to touch either, and their reluctance in this respect has contributed as much as any other cause to their manifest hesitation to act definitely relative to the evacuation.
Whatever the ultimate solution of this difficulty may be, it is certain that the administration has nothing to gain by delay. The entire nation considers the questions of the Southern forts the most important issue before it, and the sooner they decide it, either one way or the other, the better for itself and all its friends. Symptoms of a reaction in public opinion as to the absolute necessity of the abandonment of Fort Sumter are already audible in the form of loud growls of many of the republican leaders now here. They ask if it must be done, why not do it at once, and express themselves unable to understand how so much time and attention can be bestowed upon the distribution of the spoils, and matters of such vital importance apparently neglected.