“The plan of the leaders in this State appears to be, from all that I can see and hear, first, to demand the forts of the General Government, after secession, and then, if refused, to take them by force of arms. A quite large party is in favor of not waiting to ask the General Government, but to summon the immediate commanders, and, if refused, to attack at once.”
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CHARLESTON, S.C., December 4, 1860.
Col. R. E. DE RUSSY,
Commanding Corps of Engineers:
COLONEL: I have been obliged to vary the plan which I indicated in my last letters as the one I intended to follow in order to carry out the wishes of the Department concerning the security of the works under my charge. In consequence of recent developments of the state of feeling among my men, I do not now judge it proper to give them any military instruction, or to place arms in their hands; at least this is the case with reference to the men at Fort Sumter. I do not think that any of them will go so far in the defense of public property as to fight an armed body of the citizens of this State. I ascertained this for the first time, to-day, of the men in Fort Sumter, where I had been confident that I could rely in any emergency, at least upon the Baltimore mechanics, about fifty in number.
But the overseer ascertained last night that they were disinclined to use force to resist an attempt to seize the fort on the part of the citizen soldiers of the State, although willing to resist a mob. The men in Castle Pinckney, placed there as I intended, on the 3d instant, being picked men, may prove more reliable. But the feeling here in regard to secession is become so strong that almost all are entirely influenced by it. I therefore judge it best to suspend all idea of arming them at present. I may mention that I exercised as much care as possible in placing this working party in Castle Pinckney, so as not to give cause for apprehension of arming to the citizens. The greatest prudence was exercised, and the best men placed there, under charge of a prudent and reliable officer, Lieutenant Davis. Every precaution is also taken at Fort Sumter, where Lieutenant Snyder has taken up his quarters. Having done thus much, which is all I can do in this respect, I feel that I have done my duty, and that if any overt act takes place, no blame can properly attach to me. I regret, however, that sufficient soldiers are not in this harbor to garrison these two works. The Government will soon have to decide the question whether to maintain them or to give them up to South Carolina. If it be decided to maintain them, troops must instantly be sent, and in large numbers. If it be decided to give them up, the present arrangement will answer very well; only I should be informed, in order that I may know how to act.
At present I have given orders to Lieutenants Snyder and Davis to resist to the utmost any attempt or any demand on the forts in which they are stationed.
The plan of the leaders in this State appears to be, from all that I can see and hear, first, to demand the forts of the General Government, after secession, and then, if refused, to take them by force of arms. A quite large party is in favor of not waiting to ask the General Government, but to summon the immediate commanders, and, if refused, to attack at once. All of this is not, of course, strictly in the line of my profession; still, I judge it proper to write you fully and plainly, so that you may know exactly how we are placed. Here in Fort Moultrie the two companies of the garrison having dwindled to half their proper size, are so weak that Major Anderson demands all the auxiliary defense that I can give him. I am now digging a wet ditch around the work, which, although necessarily shallow from the quicksand, will more than double the difficulty of scaling the walls. The major also requires a fraise to be placed around the coping, but I cannot commence it until I finish the work in hand.
I shall to-morrow complete the “cut” at the northwest angle, which I have enlarged somewhat in the form of a bastionette, by building straight up from the foundation a wall at the angle extending ten feet from the angle on each face, and then uniting by oblique returns with the very sloping face of the scarp wall. This gives a very excellent position for four or more muskets, to flank the west face of the work. The marginal sketch gives an imperfect idea of it. It is singular that a small cut, as indicated on the map in the Engineer Office, was originally built at this angle, but subsequently, and apparently not many years since, destroyed by breaking off the upper part of the side walls, throwing the débris into the cut, and covering the parapet over it. I completed to-day the bastionette at the southwest angle, except the embrasures, the stones and some of the irons for which have not yet been received. Before taking down the temporary bastionette at the southeast angle and commencing the permanent one, I shall, for the greater security of the small garrison, run out a wooden machicoulis gallery over the angle of the wall, and also complete the pointing of all large crevices in the scarp.
The posterns on the east and west curtains have been bricked up at Major Anderson’s request, as he felt too weak to use them for sorties, and as the doors might be burst in, both the iron and wood work being old and defective.
I have been liberal of assistance in increasing the defensive capacities of the fort, for I felt that the necessity required it. I have about 125 men at work here now, and shall continue the same number for two or three days, until I complete the ditch. On Fort Sumter I have about 115, and at Castle Pinckney 30, making a total of 260 men employed. The first of the embrasure stones for Fort Sumter having been received, the embrasures of the second tier will be immediately commenced.
Very respectfully, yours,
J. G. FOSTER,
Captain of Engineers.