February 23, 1863, The New York Herald
The significant special advices from Washington which we published yesterday, in reference to Mr. Seward’s late peace proposition to the French government, involve considerations of too much importance to be lightly passed over. What is this peace proposition? Mr. Seward, in his despatch to Mr. Dayton, our Minister at Paris, dated February 6, after emphatically dismissing the recommendations of France for a peace conference in some neutral country, between delegates from the two parties involved in this war, says:
On the other hand, the Congress of the United States furnishes a constitutional forum for debates between the alienated parties. Senators and Representatives from the loyal people are there already, fully empowered to confer. And seats are also vacant and inviting the Senators and Representatives of the discontented party, who may be constitutionally sent there from the States involved in the insurrection. Moreover, the conferences which can thus be held in Congress have this great advantage over any that could be organized on the plan of Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, viz: That Congress, if it thought wise, could call a national convention to adopt its recommendations, and give them all the solemnity and binding force of organic law. Such conferences between the alienated parties may be said to have already begun. Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri – States which are claimed by the insurgents – are already represented in Congress, and are submitting, with perfect freedom and in a proper spirit, their advice upon the course best calculated to bring about in the shortest time a firm, lasting and honorable peace. Representatives have been sent, also, from Louisiana, and others are understood to be coming from Arkansas. There is a preponderating argument in favor of the Congressional form of conference over that which is suggested by Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, viz: That while accession to the latter would bring the government into concurrence with the insurgents in disregarding and setting aside an important part of the constitution of the United States, and so would be of pernicious example, the Congressional conference, on the contrary, preserves and gives new strength to that sacred instrument, which must continue through future ages the sheet anchor of the republic.
Now, it is altogether probable that the idea, and the only idea, here intended to be conveyed to the French government is that European mediation is inadmissible in any form, as there can be no accommodation, no peace with our rebellious States, short of their absolute submission to the Union. This conclusion inevitably attached itself to the required return to the national Congress of the absentee Senators and Representatives from those States which are now represented in the rebel Congress at Richmond. Mr. Seward’s suggestion of a national convention follows the indispensable submission which he demands. But in these suggestions of the Secretary of State, though his design may have been to close the door, he really opens it to European interposition in behalf of peace.
Assuming that Louis Napoleon has thus determined to act in behalf of Mr. Seward’s Congressional plan of pacification, we cannot imagine, in view of the paramount object of a general peace, that there would be any difficulty in gaining the cooperation of the other great Powers of Europe. Having secured their concurrence, the Emperor of the French next announces the fact to our government, and that it is his purpose to contribute his aid to secure the submission of the rebellious States in the manner proposed by Mr. Seward. The rebel government at Richmond is next informed that this devastating war has lasted long enough; that the common interests of humanity and the especial interests of France and of the South demand peace and that France calls upon the so styled “Confederate States” to restore their representatives to the two houses of the Congress of the United States, according to the requisitions of the federal constitution, and warns the rebel authorities that, failing to obey this call, the military power of France will be employed to enforce compliance; while they are promised, on the other hand, the friendly offices of the Emperor in the reconstruction of the general government. And what then? Peace and reunion; for, thus advised and admonished, it is certain that the rebel authorities would surrender at discretion.
European mediation and intervention in this form are, we may say, invited by Mr. Seward, and great advantages would accrue to France in acting upon his suggestions. She would secure thereby those much desired Southern staples of cotton and tobacco to any amount; she would regain the good will of the United States and of both sections thereof; she would thus effectually checkmate the transatlantic designs of England, dependent upon the dissolution of this Union; and she would place our government in a position to extricate the Emperor from his present perilous position in Mexico, upon a political, commercial and financial arrangement satisfactory and advantageous to France, the United States, Mexico and the world at large. Above all, France, in the re-establishment of peace on this continent, would ward off that impending European convulsion which is beginning to cast its dark premonitory shadows over the Napoleonic dynasty.
The rebellious States of the South, in their compulsory return to the federal Congress through this intervention of France, would be abundantly compensated. They would be immediately relieved from the terrible privations, sufferings, conscriptions and extortions which they are now compelled to endure; their stocks on hand of their last two year’s crops of cotton, sugar and tobacco would be at once brought into a hungry market; the Southern slaveholder would be at once rescued from the terrors of President Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation and an abolition crusade; Southern institutions, society and industry would be restored to the protection of the constitution; but greater than all these compensations would be the advantages gained of a conservative control, through Congress, of the general government. If all the Southern States today were fully represented at Washington the abolition faction would be utterly powerless to do any further mischief; but, with the new guarantees of future security indicated in Mr. Seward’s proposed convention, there would be absolute safety to the South in the government against all future contingencies.
There are yet other considerations which may contribute to turn the mind of Louis Napoleon to mediation upon the basis of Mr. Seward’s Congressional plan of peace. The rebellious States are now in a most critical position. They may be overrun and laid waste by the superior military power of the Union, or the war may be indefinitely prolonged, to their utter exhaustion and destruction, cotton and tobacco included. This reflection alone may satisfy Louis Napoleon that the rebel leaders are not in a condition to hesitate in accepting his friendly interposition for peace. As for our own government, it would hardly refuse its consent to European mediation upon the basis suggested by the Secretary of State.
We are not surprised that the subject is attracting the attention of the diplomatic circles at Washington; nor shall we be surprised if, within a few weeks, the news shall reach us from France that the Emperor, with the consent of the other great European Powers, adopting the hint of Mr. Seward, had determined upon mediation for peace in America to the extent of compelling our rebellious States to return to the Congress of the Union. We think that our information from Washington foreshadows a deliberate diplomatic movement in this direction, and that Louis Napoleon, in order to reopen trade with the South, and to circumvent the ulterior designs of England, and to extricate himself from Mexico, may probably act upon this idea, and in a masterly coup d’ put an end to the disturbing Southern despotism of Jeff. Davis and his impracticable Southern confederacy.