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June 22, 1863, The Charleston Mercury

(CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MERCURY.)

RICHMOND, Tuesday, JUne 16.

LEE’S favorite movement, en echelon – that by which he uncovered the fords of the Chickahominy and swept McCLELLAN back to Harrison’s Bar, by which he advanced upon Manassas last year, and lately upon HOOKER at Chancellorsville and the Wilderness – is now being executed on a grand scale. On the extreme left, Jenkins, with his cavalry, began the movement by threatening Milroy at Winchester, while under the dust of Stuart’s noisy cavalry review, Ewell’s infantry marched into the Valley by way of Front Royal. Longstreet, in Culpeper, silently edged his van within supporting distance of Ewell rear, keeping at the same time Picket’s division detached for the purpose of reinforcing A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg, or of strengthening the brigades defending Richmond in case the city were seriously menaced from below. The head of Ewell’s column no sooner appeared in the Valley than Jenkins pushed still further to the left in the direction of Martinsburg and Romney, and the great arc of movement was increased by the advance, still en echelon, of columns as far down as North Carolina. The whole of this great maneouvre was at once developed and completed on Sunday last, by the retirement from Stafford of Hooker’s rear guard, which left A. P. Hill free to take his place in the line of progress.

You see at once the entire system of curved, lapping lines of advance, stretching from Richmond to Harper’s Ferry, and circling slowly westward and northward, as if it were intended to cross the Potomac, sweep through Western Maryland into Pennsylvania, and to debouch the converging columns in rear of Washington, perhaps in rear of Baltimore. This, however, is merely conjecture. The plan, whatever it may be, is subject to modifications incident to the movements of the enemy. Pontoon trains accompany the army, and these may be designed either to facilitate the passage of the river at points not fordable, or to be used at the fords in case of the river rising.

The disclosures just made are not improper, for two reasons – first; the plot will reach its denouement before this letter can be printed and get into the hands of the enemy; and, second, the enemy is already pretty well aware of the whole movement. Hooker has not been deceived by Stuart’s cavalry review, clever as they were. His advance was at Alexandria and Manassas long before his rear guard left their newly-made entrenchments at Deep Run. He has held Hill in check until Ewell got well into the Valley, and until nothing less than Jacksonian forced marches will enable him to support Longstreet.

Our line is weak in two places – the intervals between Ewell and Longstreet, and between the latter and Hill – but an advance into these intervals would place Hooker between two fires. He will probably threaten Longstreet’s passage into the Valley until the fords in front of Ewell are heavily fortified and manned, or he may give battle between Leesburg and Manassas. Ewell ought to have been in Winchester on Sunday; a week must elapse before Hill can get up; and so nothing definite need be expected before the 20th or 25th of this month unless, as before stated, Hooker gives battle in Virginia.

Lee’s advance is based upon the supposition that it will strengthen the hands of the peace party and give countenance to such as are inclined to resist the conscription. Lee has plenary powers, his army is large enough to do the work set before it, and if he will keep it well together, he may, before the first of July, give Hooker a much harder, and more decisive blow than McClellan received at Sharpsburg. But experience has shown that no serious damage can be done to a Yankee army by attacking it in front; the men have too many legs; and if the attempt be made to bag it, our lines are so weakened that only partial success is accomplished. It may be well, therefore, to restrain visionary anticipations of crushing defeats in Maryland, the capture of Washington, etc. It is some relief to have the war removed a little further from the seat of government, but no one knows the damage the surrounding country will sustain from predatory gunboat and cavalry raids, so long as Elzey’s singular system of withdrawing all the troops into the defences is followed.

With regard to Vicksburg I can give you no comfort. The Administration is by no means sanguine.

Drought continues. Spring oats destroyed. Vegetables cut short. Corn crop seriously threatened.

HERMES.

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