June 2, 1863, The New York Herald
When General Hooker was before the Congressional committee sundry questions were put to him which accomplished what they were intended to do, and brought out, not the truth, but General Hooker. He was purposely given an opportunity to say to the country, from a high standpoint, whatever he had to say about the war. He was asked about Yorktown. Upon that subject his opinions were positive, and after some preliminary queries he was squarely requested to state what he would have done at Yorktown had he then been in command of the army. He cited the battle of Williamsburg as the indication of what he would have done. He invited the country to judge of his abilities by that battle. There, he said, he had advanced with his single division against a line of works stronger than the line at Yorktown. Here is a military opinion of the relative strength of those two line. Can it be credited that the finest army in the United States is now under the command of a man who is such a tyro in military matters as not to know which of those two lines was the stronger, and not to know that this statement was absurdly false? Well, Gen. Hooker advanced, and this is what came of it: he fought all day, lost seventeen hundred men, and failed – disastrously, miserably failed – to carry the position. That is what he would have done at Yorktown – that is the battle he desires to be known by. With all deference to those who are wise in war, we are of the opinion that any one could do that. Yet such was in reality Gen. Hooker’s part in the great battle by which he first became widely known. Moreover, his battle had been fought in defiance of orders. Now, when a general fights in violation of orders, loses heavily, and does not accomplish his object, it is, or ought to be, a serious mater. Charges were accordingly made out against Gen. Hooker by the proper persons, and he was in a fair way to be dismissed the service, or worse. But in the meantime the battle had been trumpeted as a great victory, and Gen. Hooker was a very large hero. How would it look to the country – a battle had been gained – Gen. Hooker helped to gain it, and he was to be dismissed the service. That would never do. So the General’s violation of orders – his failure and his heavy loss – only helped to make his fame. Thus ended Hooker’s first notorious essay as a general.
He made another nearly upon the anniversary of the first. Near Falmouth, he had, as our readers know, a magnificent army. He said it was finest “army on the planet.” In front of him was a rebel army half the size of his own. Gen. Hooker had – and knew that he had – two to one for every man under Lee. His first act was to throw away this advantage in a great measure by the division of his force. He divided his army and put an interval of ten miles between the two parts. He next put the enemy in that interval, covered on one face by their intrenchments, and his strategy amounted to this: Under the delusion that he was about to operate on the enemy’s rear he lessened his effective strength by a whole corps, and made the parts of his army act separately against a central force. As was foreseen, and as events have proven, these parts of his army were fought in detail, and absolute annihilation was only prevented by his great superiority in numbers, his hasty retreat and the stubborn fight of the Sixth corps.
For the merits of this movement strategically it is claimed that it nullified the strong position on the heights behind Fredericksburg, and compelled the enemy to come out into the field and fight. But it is very easy to make your enemy come out of his stronghold when you put yourself in a position where he sees that you are at his mercy – and that is the way that Hooker brought Lee out.
General Hooker marched and manoeuvred for four days, occupied that time in his advance against the enemy, and then the enemy fought an offensive battle in a field of which they knew every square inch. He chose his position, rested in it, and was beaten there without a battle. For, if his strategy is bad, his grand tactics are a great deal worse, and so far as any direction or guidance from General Hooker is implied the battle was not fought at all. Surprised by the attack on one flank when he had prepared against it on the other, he seems to have become bewildered, and lost all comprehension of the state of affairs. Indeed, Hooker seemed to have placed himself at the head of one corps only, and had no idea of the great army under his command. Different corps fought without any unity of purpose whatever, and he who should have governed all overlooked only an isolates struggle, until he was knocked down by a post. Less than one-third of his force was taken into battle, and with six corps under his command he did not maintain so stout a fight as General Sedgwick did on the next day with only one. General Hooker even expected assistance from Sedgwick in his fight on Sunday, May 3. Lee had sixty-four thousand men, and Hooker, with over a hundred thousand, was […..] Lee.” And, while with a hundred thousand he fought sixty-four thousand, he expected that Sedgwick, with a single corps and one division of another, should storm Marye’s Hill, march ten miles and come to his assistance. Evidently this great strategist and fighter has a limited confidence in his own abilities.
Lee is now represented as on the march for offensive operations – perhaps for invasion. He can see very well that an army under General Hooker is not a serious obstacle, and he will scatter it as he did the army under Pope. When Pope was beaten, and all in disorder, McClellan was recalled, and then ensued the Maryland campaign, full of disaster to the rebels, and closed by the battle of Antietam. But here also Lee feels secure. Under no circumstances can McClellan be recalled. After all that has taken place it is a moral impossibility for the President to put that man at the head of the army. It is only against Hooker or some newer experiment that Lee must struggle, and he advances with confidence.