CHATTANOOGA, Jany. 26th, 1863.
“My dear Wigfall:
“I have asked the government by telegraph if any additional troops, new or old, can be furnished for Bragg’s Army, but have had no reply. Will you suggest to Mr. Seddon that we are in a very critical condition in Tennessee? The enemy has fully supplied his losses, I am officially informed, while our army has received stragglers and exchanged prisoners amounting to about a third of our killed and wounded. Such being the case, if there is any truth in arithmetic, another battle must drive us still farther back. If driven across the Cumberland Mountains we can not hold East Tennessee and once in possession of that country Rosecranz may choose his point on our South Eastern or Eastern frontier from Richmond to Mobile. It is of the utmost importance therefore to reinforce Bragg. The conscription is operating very slowly. Can no mode of expediting its enforcement be adopted? I cannot draw upon Pemberton, for his force is far too small now. I proposed the bringing to him 18,000 or 20,000 troops from Arkansas, none of whom ever came. The enemy is again at Vicksburg, too, in heavier force, and doubtless with a different plan—probably to attempt to attack from below instead of from the Yazoo.
“Bragg has done wonders, I think—no body of troops has done more in proportion to numbers in the same time. At Murfreesboro’ he killed, wounded and took 17,000 and within the three weeks preceding 7,500. His own loss in all that time about 9,000. My own official position does not improve on acquaintance. It is little, if any, better than being laid on the shelf. I have endeavored to explain this to the President, but he thinks it essential to have one here who can transfer troops from this department to Pemberton’s and vice-versa. That would be extremely well if either department could possibly spare troops, even for a short time, but that is not the case, each having too few for immediate purposes and the distance and character of the intermediate country such as completely prevents them from aiding each other, except an occasional cavalry movement. It is an attempt to join things which cannot be united. It would require at least a month to send 10,000 men from one of the two armies to the other. Each department having its own commander and requiring—indeed having room but for one. You perceive how little occupation I can find. I can not unite the two armies—because they are too far apart, and each is required where it is. Nor can I take command of one because each has its proper commander, and yet the country may hold me responsible for any failure between North Carolina and Georgia and the Mississippi, for I am supposed to be commanding in all that country. After commanding our most important, and I may add, best army for a year, it is hard to lose that command for wounds in battle and to receive a nominal one. I must confess I cannot help repining at this position. The President, however, evidently intends that I shall hold a high position and important one; but I think he mistakes the relation between Tennessee and Mississippi.
“I flatter myself that I have never been so garrulous before and won’t be so again.
“We rarely see Richmond papers, so I don’t know what you are doing for us. My cordial regards to Mrs. Wigfall and the young ladies.
“If you can help me out of my present place I shall love you more than ever. It will require diplomacy and cunning, however, and I don’t think you strong in the latter.
“Yours truly,
“J. E. JOHNSTON.”